So 'globalisation', or rather 'economic integration' and 'economic dependence' are relatively recent phenomena. Of course historically there has always been vibrant trade, but the extent to which geographically disparate regions were 'dependent' on one another is debatable.
There's a case to suggest that the way grain markets in Early Modern Europe functioned meant that Europe was then economically interdependent - that different states would mitigate against famine in other states by the transfer of surpluses. This also tells us that surpluses are key here - such economic interdependence is thus a function of, or at least co-dependent upon capitalism in general. The other aspect of economic interdependence is just how much catastrophe a state is willing to endure. If the country is dependent upon, say, Polish grain, but the king doesn't care about major famines, then political autonomy isn't really affected.
So globalist problems of economic interdependence have only really been a thing in the last 500 years or so to be generous, but really we're talking about the 18th century where things really start to be seen.
Typically how its played out is that a major power wants to achieve some kind of economic autonomy for the sake of political sovereignty, and goes to war to do it, rather than achieving economic autonomy and then going to war because they can.
The Napoleonic wars had this character - defending the revolution - and the French tried really hard to separate British economic interests from the continent using various legal instruments, to try to achieve economic autonomy.
WWII was certainly about this, if you look closely at Japan, Germany and Italy.
In our time, it is the express policy of Putin to further national 'sovereignty', and sanctions are very probably aiding him in that goal. In a few decades, Chinese economic might allied to Russian political will will very probably recreate a multipolar world once more with at least two economic poles, and that would de facto be the end of the Pax Americana
