If I am unable to stop doing something that I do not want to do, but keep doing then do I have free will? Or am I a slave to it? Last I checked slaves do not have free will. Enlighten me.
This is a tricky question because of the qualifier you used (which I bolded). This phrase is often used as short hand in normal speech, but philosophic free will needs to be strict.
Consider this example. It is necessary that I breathe. I continue breathing. To an extent, my breathing is an unconscious activity, and by definition is uncontrolled. Now, suppose I don't like breathing. I find it disgusting. It seems correct now to say that "I am unable to stop doing something that I do not want to do, and I keep doing it". But let me ask you this. If I were to take a gun and shoot myself in the head, would I not stop breathing? Clearly yes. So really, when I said "I am unable to stop doing something that I do not want to do" I really mean "If I am to continue in X state, then I am unable to stop doing something that I do not want to do". I want to continue living, but I don't like breathing. I want to continue living more than I don't like breathing, so I am unable to stop breathing. See how the statement is a short hand? This is only one example also. It can be short hand for other meanings.
The second part of your question, the part about do you have free will, is a separate question from the first point. Whether or not you can or can't do
some specific action does not qualify or disqualify you as having free will.
To explain, I will nit pick in some philosophy of language, so if I am unclear please say so. I can rephrase if you want
.
This is the definition of free will from the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/):
“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.
Now, this is tricky, but one should recognize the pieces of free will in this definition. It is a
capacity of rational agents to
choose a course of
action from among various
alternatives. The debate in philosophy is what is meant by alternatives. Need they be real alternatives or simply theoretical? This is to say that even though I couldn't actually have done differently, it is enough that, had things been different, I could have chosen differently. The incompatibilists (referencing the determinism/free will debate) say that the alternatives must be actual while the compatibilists say they may simply be theoretical.
So back to your question, it depends on your definition of free will. Are you a compatibilist or an incompatibilist? The compatibilist certainly would say free will exists in your example IF you would say something like, it is at least
theoretically possible for you to do differently. The incompatibilist would even be willing to grant the existence of free will IF you were to find free will elsewhere in the world. So perhaps it isn't apparent in this example, but it might be apparent in some other example. So long as free will is demonstrated somewhere, then the incompatibilist will accept that free will exists. It just might not be the kind of free will we are looking for.
Sorry, that was a long post. If I need to clarify anything, feel free to ask! I love the topic of free will
