So, is logic a science or an art?
What's to say it's not both?
one thing about logic is that there are more than two possibilities and several of them could be true.
Yes. This is probably responsible for a lot of notions such as metaphysics - the search for fundamental and universal natures.
There's nothing necessarily wrong with this in itself, but in a lot of cases it has led to reifying the abstract, thinking that the abstract fundamental law is what unifies things, when rather it is probably the fact that certain things are fundamentally unified which leads to the creation of the abstract law.
In other words people take the descriptive and explanatory and try to act like it's the fundamental ideal itself which is universal.
What happens if I say that "Flipofftacles' law says you are wrong!"? Isn't Flipofftacles supposedly metaphysical here? If I posit that Flipofftacles is transcendent and beyond the senses, where does that leave us? It leaves us puzzling out whether Flipofftacles actually exists somehow, which goes against my metaphysical proposition of Flipofftacles, and one's reaction may be to say that
Flipofftacles doesn't exist.
It becomes an ontological problem which might end up as an attempt to de-metaphyisicalize Flippoftacles which would contradict his transcendent nature. So that we either have to accept that we're all wrong because Flipofftacles says so, which ends up being a problem with universals and fundamentals because it breaks all of them, or we have to accept that not all metaphysical things are fundamental and that a metaphysical thing can be wrong, which is another problem for universals, or we try to figure out that Flipofftacles isn't actually there which drags him out of the metaphysical.
This can all be avoided by just throwing away that troublesome ideal all together. If something is fundamental and universal and it works, it's sufficient to call it that.
Who cares about it being 'more than physical'? Why even bother with that notion?