Nietzsche meets Wittgenstein

[Ren]

It's interesting because I didn't feel that way at all when I read his book. I didn't feel like his critiques influenced my judgement. For example, he says pretty damning things about Nietzsche, but I came out of the book loving Nietzsche just as much. In fact I think I appreciated his work more as a result, because I saw it treated as a purely human creation, full of potential flaws, rather than as the superhuman product of a daunting "giant". All philosophers are fallible. That's what I like about them, and Russell does a great job of reminding us of it.

I wonder if being Ni-dom facilitates this kind of perspective, i.e. not being too bothered by what looks like harsh judgements and seeing through the substance underneath.

New If I learned anything over the years, it's that judging a thing is easier than understanding it from the correct point of view (not from your perspective).

Just as an aside, I don't really agree with this. I mean, of course understanding requires openness, but I've often found that the best philosophers are those who are capable of engaging critically with the works of the "giants". And engaging critically must involve a dimension of judging---at the end of the day you have to say if you think the "giant" is correct or not. Heck, I just love how Russell criticises Aquinas, where everyone seems to spend the time just wildly masturbating over his supreme genius He doesn't care about the reputation of a thinker, he doesn't factor that into his critiques. I think this is the mark of an independent mind.

 

[Ren]

But Russell is still kind of a dick lol.

He is, and to be honest he is sometimes wrong. But I prefer his style because at least he has the courage to say what he thinks---I think he knew from the start that he would be attacked for it.

Maybe his book is better appreciated by someone who already has good background knowledge of the topics and isn't in danger of being unduly influenced by Russell's own opinions. I'm not sure. I wasn't particularly advanced in my knowledge of philosophy when I read his History for the first time, and I didn't find that his book coloured my interpretation of other thinkers. Rather, it taught me to approach those thinkers critically and to remember that their works are human products regardless of their status.

 

[Sidis Coruscatis]

Maybe his book is better appreciated by someone who already has good background knowledge of the topics and isn't in danger of being unduly influenced by Russell's own opinions. I'm not sure.

I think that might be the case with any philosophical topic.

I will admit that I haven't read Russell outside of context where he responds to another philosopher. I have Philosophy of Logical Atomism that I intended to read in tandem with Wittgenstein but there's just too many damn books to read.

 

[philostam]

I wonder if being Ni-dom facilitates this kind of perspective, i.e. not being too bothered by what looks like harsh judgements and seeing through the substance underneath.

Just as an aside, I don't really agree with this. I mean, of course understanding requires openness, but I've often found that the best philosophers are those who are capable of engaging critically with the works of the "giants". And engaging critically must involve a dimension of judging---at the end of the day you have to say if you think the "giant" is correct or not. Heck, I just love how Russell criticises Aquinas, where everyone seems to spend the time just wildly masturbating over his supreme genius He doesn't care about the reputation of a thinker, he doesn't factor that into his critiques. I think this is the mark of an independent mind.

Yeah, it could be something about the Ni-Ti difference.

I think I am just tired of judging, lol. Yes, it does show independence of mind to rip into a thinker (with good arguments of course; otherwise it's just trolling), but it's something I am more wired to do.

Trying to understand a thing without judging (at least in the beginning) is something I am currently trying to develop.

 

[philostam]

It's ineffective but often necessary. When you spend years pondering something abstract in order to understand it, you have to synthesize large amounts of information to produce more digestible truths. But the communication of these truths to others is not commensurable with the form in which they exist within yourself, because it's impossible to retain all those turning points that led you to your current conclusion - the whole process of learning and understanding is about simplification.

The only way how to go around this would be writing an actual book to provide a thorough systematic diagram of that conclusion, but then again understanding the book itself might necessitate reading other books that provide building blocks for a full interpretative framework. It's really a mess. I don't think this is a bad thing though - if everything was equally understandable, there would be no reason to pick one system over another because they all make sense, which subsequently leads to dissipation where nothing really matters because everything is correct.

Yeah, I get that, well said.

 

[Ren]

Trying to understand a thing without judging (at least in the beginning) is something I am currently trying to develop.

OK, then ditch the damn Russell book for now

The Anthony Kenny book is much more suited to what you're looking for at the moment, I think, but it's quite long. You can have a look here.

 

[philostam]

I wasn't particularly advanced in my knowledge of philosophy when I read his History for the first time, and I didn't find that his book coloured my interpretation of other thinkers. Rather, it taught me to approach those thinkers critically and to remember that their works are human products regardless of their status.

You see, this is something I never had to 'learn'. Not because I was an amazing critic, but just because I was an arrogant little shit with no respect for anybody.

But even this is not true, because I do/did get attached to certain people/thinkers. I had my Nietzsche and my Marx phase. Currently I think I am more well rounded, but who knows. I will know only in a few years, looking back.

As a side note, I like the short principles of Ray Dalio that he posts on twitter. I think he's a good example of a mature 'thinker' (he's probably an INTP).

 

[Ren]

Perhaps working backwards, from each of their frameworks will be helpful. What are commonalities of hidden worlds and logical mistakes.
What notions can be formed in bringing these two together.

To come back to this:

For Wittgenstein any meaningful proposition is a picture of a state of affairs. For example: "The cat is on the mat." The logical structure of the proposition mirrors the logical structure of the world, of which the state of affairs is a part. If you take the totality of states of affairs (facts) you have the world. In this sense a logically sound proposition gives a picture of the world. By contrast, a logically unsound proposition fails to provide such a picture. For Wittgenstein a logically unsound proposition is a proposition without sense. The test for sense is whether the logical structure of the proposition can be reduced to what he calls "atomic facts". The proposition picturing an atomic fact is termed an elementary proposition. It follows that any meaningful proposition, i.e. a proposition with sense, is a proposition which results from a complex operation between elementary propositions. He calls such propositions thoughts.

To summarise, the basic structure of the world is made up of atomic facts. All atomic facts are interconnected (Wittgenstein often refers to logic as a "mesh") in a way that can't be grounded in a metaphysical account, because it is the very interconnectedness of atomic facts which makes the meaningfulness of language possible by means of picturing. In other words, we can't isolate a single elementary proposition as grounding the others, because to do so would amount to sundering the interconnectedness of atomic facts. (Thus all thoughts are only partial pictures of the world). But this is precisely what a metaphysical proposition purports to do. Therefore a metaphysical proposition is necessarily meaningless, rendering the entirety of metaphysical discourse meaningless.

The first obvious link with Nietzsche is that for Nietzsche, "hidden worlds" are the worlds posited by metaphysics, like the realm of the Ideal Forms of Plato, which in a sense constitutes their common DNA. Wittgenstein would say that Plato's position cannot be translated into a proposition with sense, because in order to have sense, it would have to simultaneously posit its interconnectedness with all other elementary propositions and related atomic facts (such as the facts about the world of sense, i.e. the non-ideal, sensual world), thereby annihilating its metaphysical "grounding" nature. So you could say that Wittgenstein uses his logical atomism to bolster an anti-metaphysical position similar in its consequences to Nietzsche's.

Things get more complicated when we look at the concrete content of Nietzsche's world. For him, yes there is only the world of the senses, you could say, which might (at a push) be rendered into a world of facts, but he takes those "facts" to be perspectivistic. "There are no facts, only interpretations". I think this may be reconcilable with Wittgenstein's notion that each atomic fact presupposes all other atomic facts to which it is connected. But I'll do more thinking on this before I develop this further. You're welcome to point out any inconsistencies in my reasoning of course!

 

[Wyote]

Wittgenstein's notion that each atomic fact presupposes all other atomic facts to which it is connected. But I'll do more thinking on this before I develop this further.

I like where this is going, I'm thinking open monism fits in that reconciliation

 

[Ren]

I like where this is going, I'm thinking open monism fits in that reconciliation

 

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