Enduring Problems in Philosophy

There can't be any empirical existence if it isn't perceived by something.

This is the stance which Quentin Meillassoux describes as correlationism: the idea that all we can have access to is the correlation between thought and being.

I think that in After Finitude, he makes a decisive argument to the effect that this position is untenable. I'll quote from the book to provide a brief snippet into his (larger) argument.

- First, he defines as 'ancestral' any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species – or even anterior to every recognized form of life on earth.
- Second, he defines as 'arche-fossil' not just materials indicating the traces of past life, according to the familiar sense of the term ‘fossil’, but materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event; one that is anterior to terrestrial life. An arche-fossil designates the material support on the basis of which the experiments that yield estimates of ancestral phenomena proceed – for example, an isotope whose rate of radioactive decay we know, or the luminous emission of a star that informs us as to the date of its formation.

Now I'll provide the snippets of his argument. I recommend reading it carefully, as it is profound and quite penetrating.

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"For the correlationist, in order to grasp the profound meaning of the fossil datum, one should not proceed from the ancestral past, but from the correlational present. This means that we have to carry out a retrojection of the past on the basis of the present. What is given to us, in effect, is not something that is anterior to givenness, but merely something that is given in the present but gives itself as anterior to givenness. The logical (constitutive, originary) anteriority of givenness over the being of the given therefore enjoins us to subordinate the apparent sense of the ancestral statement to a more profound counter-sense, which is alone capable of delivering its meaning: it is not ancestrality which precedes givenness, but that which is given in the present which retrojects a seemingly ancestral past. To understand the fossil, it is necessary to proceed from the present to the past, following a logical order, rather than from the past to the present, following a chronological order.

Accordingly, any attempt to refute dogmatism forces two decisions upon the philosopher faced with ancestrality: the doubling of meaning, and retrojection. The deeper sense of ancestrality resides in the logical retrojection imposed upon its superficially chronological sense. Try as we might, we do not see any other way to make sense of the arche-fossil while remaining faithful to the injunctions of the correlation.

Now, why is this interpretation of ancestrality obviously insupportable? Well, to understand why, all we have to do is ask the correlationist the following question: what is it that happened 4.56 billion years ago? Did the accretion of the earth happen, yes or no?

In one sense, yes, the correlationist will reply, because the scientific statements pointing to such an event are objective, in other words, intersubjectively verifiable. But in another sense, no, she will go on, because the referent of such statements cannot have existed in the way in which it is naïvely described, i.e. as non-correlated with a consciousness. But then we end up with a rather extraordinary claim: the ancestral statement is a true statement, in that it is objective, but one whose referent cannot possibly have actually existed in the way this truth describes it. It is a true statement, but what it describes as real is an impossible event; it is an ‘objective’ statement, but it has no conceivable object. Or to put it more simply: it is a non-sense. Another way of saying the same thing is to remark that if ancestral statements derived their value solely from the current universality of their verification they would be completely devoid of interest for the scientists who take the trouble to validate them. One does not validate a measure just to demonstrate that this measure is valid for all scientists; one validates it in order to determine what is measured. It is because certain radioactive isotopes are capable of informing us about a past event that we try to extract from them a measure of their age: turn this age into something unthinkable and the objectivity of the measure becomes devoid of sense and interest, indicating nothing beyond itself. Science does not experiment with a view to validating the universality of its experiments; it carries out repeatable experiments with a view to external referents which endow these experiments with meaning.

Thus the retrojection which the correlationist is obliged to impose upon the ancestral statement amounts to a veritable counter-sense with respect to the latter: an ancestral statement only has sense if its literal sense is also its ultimate sense. If one divides the sense of the statement, if one invents for it a deeper sense conforming to the correlation but contrary to its realist sense, then far from deepening its sense, one has simply cancelled it. This is what we shall express in terms of the ancestral statement’s irremediable realism: either this statement has a realist sense, and only a realist sense, or it has no sense at all. This is why a consistent correlationist should stop ‘compromising’ with science and stop believing that she can reconcile the two levels of meaning without undermining the content of the scientific statement which she claims to be dealing with. There is no possible compromise between the correlation and the arche-fossil: once one has acknowledged one, one has thereby disqualified the other. In other words, the consistent correlationist should stop being modest and dare to assert openly that she is in a position to provide the scientist with an a priori demonstration that the latter’s ancestral statements are illusory: for the correlationist knows that what they describe can never have taken place the way it is described."

(After Finitude, Chapter. I, pp. 25-26)

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So in conclusion, yes, I can conceive a world without mind. All I have to do is read a scientific work on arche-fossils, and assume that it is not speaking nonsense (i.e. that it is made of true statements whose referents did exist in the way the true statements describe them).
 
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But what is meaning beyond syntax and semantics? How can any meaning transcend its semantic component and still mean anything?
I can't answer the hows of that but allow me to return the question to you. How do you go about emotions when experiencing music, or any other piece of art? The experience itself is transcendent of its elemental composition. It may rely on the composition itself but it's different with every perceiver. The same can be said of space. When one walks through a hallway cramped with different elements, one may perceive a sense of crowdedness where another may perceive intimacy. Meaning is experiential. The emotions present at the time of perception create meanings.

I understand that you're implying the inherent unity of human value in Christ. But its manifestation in us is messy, especially since we're not Christ.
No, I was not. When I interpreted @John K's description of the matrix, I instinctively thought of God. This was a presumption, and mistaken at that because John was merely mentioning software. I likened software to the spiritual. I jumped on the parallel but I wasn't necessarily considering Christ as the physical manifestation of that. Admittedly, I need further elaboration from your end. How did you derive the possibility of that implication?

I don't see your reasoning here; why shouldn't it have an impact if meaning is strictly bound to the realm of psyche?
My current position is that meaning isn't strictly bound to the psyche, however its interpretation is. Meaning is derived from the experience of the elements therefore the elements themselves have to be presumed present. Without the elements --the spatio-physical--, there is nothing to perceive. Thus, meaning cannot exist. I'm trying to argue against dualism, in spite of the seeming prevalence of the mind on the subject of identity but more on this later.

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I think that Descartes has laid too deep and well worn a trap so that any suggestion that human identity is based on a kind of software leads straight down a dualism rabbit hole. There is nothing necessarily dualistic about software and it’s impossible to conceive of our world without it, any more than we can conceive it without matter and energy. They are inseparable partners, but only software can carry other than ephemeral identity.

I agree that there is nothing necessarily dualistic about software, of course. I'm happy to consider the possibility that it is higher-level/emergent from hardware, or something along those lines.

But Descartes wasn't really talking about software. In 'mind' he included qualia, free will, and so on -- properties that don't fit neatly within the concept we have of 'software'.

Which is why present-day monist philosophers struggle a great deal with qualia and free will, among other things, lol. They are hoping that neuroscience will eventually show consciousness to be some kind of higher-level property of the brain, along the lines of computer/software, but even that wouldn't seem to provide the answer to why we have qualia, free will, etc. And while they might try to argue that free will is an illusion, they will have a harder time proving the same of qualia.

One attempt to account for qualia in physicalist terms is called epiphenomenalism. It's basically the idea that mental states are caused but not themselves causal -- hence, 'epiphenomena'. But I don't find this idea very intuitive. It seems to me very clear that when I feel thirsty, or when I feel like playing a video game, this very much has causal efficacy on the fact that I end up drinking or playing a game!
 
My current position is that meaning isn't strictly bound to the psyche, however its interpretation is. Meaning is derived from the experience of the elements therefore the elements themselves have to be presumed present. Without the elements --the spatio-physical--, there is nothing to perceive. Thus, meaning cannot exist. I'm trying to argue against dualism, in spite of the seeming prevalence of the mind on the subject of identity but more on this later.

I don't think the concept of meaning is what really poses a problem for opponents of dualism. You can give reasonably adequate functionalist accounts of meaning that do not refer to mind.

I suspect that for functionalists of that ilk, identity is just an avatar of metaphysical nonsense resulting from the 'bewitchment of our intelligence with language' (Wittgenstein), lol.

Like I just said, more challenging notions are qualia and free will.
 
That's actually an excellent counter-argument to the idea that the body is separate from 'real' identity. It's obvious that nobody can seriously imagine really being an elephant.

Min -- I don't know if you're aware of this, but you've just employed a reductio ad absurdum. A familiar item in the philosopher's arsenal. :wink:

I suspect that the reason for this sense of separateness from body/mind/etc. is simply that we experience ourselves in the first person, while we can only refer to our bodies, brains, minds, etc. in the third person or in the possessive. It's a linguistic fact easily misconceived as a metaphysical one.

A subjectivist take on identity cannot step outside itself, so I would distinguish it from identity and refer to it as sense of identity. Since that is subjective, anything goes really, depending on one's flavour of subjectivity.

But in fact (not subjectively), when we speak in the first person, we are always implying the unspoken totality of what makes us -- including body, mind, etc.
Quoting to go back to this. I currently have very limited resources to pore through posts onwards this one, so let me quote to come back. Later alligaters.

p.s. nope I wasn't aware consciously aware of using the fallacy.
 
So in conclusion, yes, I can conceive a world without mind. All I have to do is read a scientific work on arche-fossils, and assume that it is not speaking nonsense (i.e. that it is made of true statements whose referents did exist in the way the true statements describe them).

At core, my argument doesn't contend any sort of truth relativism. I'm fine with acknowledging that past must be deterministic in such a way that implies some chronological consistency of material facts. But I'll give it to you, this is a head scratcher for me.

Wouldn't this world without mind be in many ways the same world as the one in which a mind has emerged? Imagine a world where no creature has developed a faculty for hearing, but sound still exists. Even if these creatures would have conceived of sound, it would have been based on their perception of tactile vibration. Would a world without mind in their conception be less complete than the one in yours? It's this paradox of knowability that concerns me - even if you could imagine a world without mind, that world itself will necessarily be shaped by the faculties of the mind imagining it. How many divergent minds would it take to give a complete account of the world?The moment we can formulate an answer to that, the answer becomes redundant.
 
I can't answer the hows of that but allow me to return the question to you. How do you go about emotions when experiencing music, or any other piece of art? The experience itself is transcendent of its elemental composition. It may rely on the composition itself but it's different with every perceiver. The same can be said of space. When one walks through a hallway cramped with different elements, one may perceive a sense of crowdedness where another may perceive intimacy. Meaning is experiential. The emotions present at the time of perception create meanings.
The answer to this is what I said to John. There's nothing indicating to me that music somehow goes beyond semantics; it's only because it lacks logically grounded syntax that makes its semantics multitudinous. We don't even have to leave language to prove this, as words themselves can be misunderstood or their semantic instability intentionally leveraged to make a joke.

No, I was not. When I interpreted @John K's description of the matrix, I instinctively thought of God. This was a presumption, and mistaken at that because John was merely mentioning software. I likened software to the spiritual. I jumped on the parallel but I wasn't necessarily considering Christ as the physical manifestation of that. Admittedly, I need further elaboration from your end. How did you derive the possibility of that implication?

Well, you objected to any preferential treatment emerging within social structures, which I naturally interpreted as advocating for some kind of intrinsic spiritual equality - and especially acting on that equality. I suppose this doesn't have to point to Christ, but it seemed like the closest and obvious reference.


My current position is that meaning isn't strictly bound to the psyche, however its interpretation is. Meaning is derived from the experience of the elements therefore the elements themselves have to be presumed present. Without the elements --the spatio-physical--, there is nothing to perceive. Thus, meaning cannot exist. I'm trying to argue against dualism, in spite of the seeming prevalence of the mind on the subject of identity but more on this later.
I agree meaning exists externally in some kind of elementary form, but what would that refined aggregate of meaning even do if it did not affect the mind which interprets it? I think I'm missing some premise which you're trying to elucidate.
 
It’s not a fallacy, it’s a traditional type of philosophical argument. You adopt a given viewpoint and derive its absurd implications.

Heeeh. Sorry for the noobness! I shall read up further. This correction is positively taken and will work on it at best. :D :p

One of the reasons I hang in this thread is because philosophy and things revolving around it, aren't my forte. All of these thinkers and these outlooks get drowned in my memory most of the time. As an academic, my weakest weakness is who said which and what verbatim, what year, and so on. I read up a lot of things and I understand in that moment but it dissipates almost instantly. I still have to look up a good percentage of the terminologies so I remember, ah that was that. I'm left with a general structure and an instinctive understanding. More than half the time, I'm answering on the fly which is why you probably see it as Ne. But, this thread requires a higher level of discipline so I will have to come back to things when I'm able to sit down and properly open my laptop. I hope you too can be patient haha. I like learning this way, so I appreciate these growth spurts. I'll be back soon. I already have a schedule in my mind about when to come back to this.
 
Heeeh. Sorry for the noobness! I shall read up further. This correction is positively taken and will work on it at best. :D :p

One of the reasons I hang in this thread is because philosophy and things revolving around it, aren't my forte. All of these thinkers and these outlooks get drowned in my memory most of the time. As an academic, my weakest weakness is who said which and what verbatim, what year, and so on. I read up a lot of things and I understand in that moment but it dissipates almost instantly. I still have to look up a good percentage of the terminologies so I remember, ah that was that. I'm left with a general structure and an instinctive understanding. More than half the time, I'm answering on the fly which is why you probably see it as Ne. But, this thread requires a higher level of discipline so I will have to come back to things when I'm able to sit down and properly open my laptop. I hope you too can be patient haha. I like learning this way, so I appreciate these growth spurts. I'll be back soon. I already have a schedule in my mind about when to come back to this.

Hmm, I like the idea of this thread requiring a high level of discipline.

:m029:
 
Imagine a world where no creature has developed a faculty for hearing, but sound still exists. Even if these creatures would have conceived of sound, it would have been based on their perception of tactile vibration. Would a world without mind in their conception be less complete than the one in yours?

Not less complete, but maybe a world in which there are fewer 'states of affairs', as Wittgenstein would put it.

It would be akin to two sets of different sizes. The set of propositions which are true of World 1 (the world prior to the emergence of consciousness) would be different from the set of propositions which are true of World 2 (the world after the emergence of consciousness). Neither set would suffer from incompleteness.

It's this paradox of knowability that concerns me - even if you could imagine a world without mind, that world itself will necessarily be shaped by the faculties of the mind imagining it.

Well, certainly in a sense it would not be possible to 'know' World 1 in the way that we 'know' World 2. It would not be possible to know what it 'felt like' to be in World 1, since it was a world without qualia.

But if Meillassoux is right (and I think that he is), it is still very much possible to have scientific, objective knowledge of World 1. According to John Searle, this 'paradox of knowability' you're talking about is based on a fallacy of ambiguity in the understanding of the word knowledge. I can't recall it right now, and I think it takes a slightly different form, but I'll try to dig it up when I get the chance.
 
I'm talking about Fitch's paradox of knowability which doesn't seem controversial in its proposition at all.

Counter-argument: Philosophy is a fallacy of ambiguity. :looninati:

I had a look at an article on Fitch's paradox of knowability. Very interesting stuff. However, I'm not sure I see how this poses a problem for the truth of statements about a world where consciousness hadn't yet emerged.

Sure, in World 1 (just like in World 2) there might be truths that are not knowable. What problem does it pose to the matter at hand? I'm just trying to get a stronger grip on the issue you're perceiving.
 
I had a look at an article on Fitch's paradox of knowability. Very interesting stuff. However, I'm not sure I see how this poses a problem for the truth of statements about a world where consciousness hadn't yet emerged.

Sure, in World 1 (just like in World 2) there might be truths that are not knowable. What problem does it pose to the matter at hand? I'm just trying to get a stronger grip on the issue you're perceiving.
I think the discussion got swept into you arguing that scientific knowledge of a mindless world can exist, while my only point was that such knowledge can only exist a priori in a logical space, while empirical imagining of that world is by definition dependent on the senses which the world itself produces. Hence the forest koan which evinces that no empirical knowledge can exist in a self-contained state without an external actor, while it also must exist to be perceived in the first place - possibly in some quantum superposition which is resolved at the moment this empirical fact collides with senses. This is then reinforced by the paradox which states that the existence of unknown truths is unknowable. The existence of the paradox has some serious ramifications on the scientific discipline which itself bears implications about the accuracy and completeness of scientific knowledge regarding both pre- and post-conscious world.

It's really just a convoluted intuitive fart.
 
Did existence begin to exist at the point where observations became observable :thonking::looninati:

This is some real chicken or egg shit. Can't exist if you can't see, can't see if you can't exist.
 
Did existence begin to exist at the point where observations became observable :thonking::looninati:

Nope. : p


This is some real chicken or egg shit. Can't exist if you can't see, can't see if you can't exist.

Pretty sure rocks happily exist without the gift of sight :thonking:
 
Nope. : p




Pretty sure rocks happily exist without the gift of sight :thonking:

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