Enduring Problems in Philosophy

So rocks can be happy now?
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Also I guess this is a good time to tell you that your meme-moji is being superseded. I think I really improved on the concept with this one.

Lmao is this you?!

Yeah, it’s exceptional. But you gotta use it repeatedly, ad infinitum, in other to harness its true potential
 
I have a clarification. Does this emoji mean you're angry?
I'm INTJ, I'm always angry. But no.

Lmao is this you?!

Yeah, it’s exceptional. But you gotta use it repeatedly, ad infinitum, in other to harness its true potential

Yeah, it took grueling 2 hours learning how to mask background in GIMP but it was worth everything. There's also the rare Approving Sid, but no one may ever see it after this again.
approvals.png
 
I'm INTJ, I'm always angry. But no.



Yeah, it took grueling 2 hours learning how to mask background in GIMP but it was worth everything. There's also the rare Approving Sid, but no one may ever see it after this again.
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You’ve no idea how happy it makes me that you went so far as to take 2 hours to make those.

*intense happiness*
 
Lololol Christ the rock?

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I'm INTJ, I'm always angry. But no.



Yeah, it took grueling 2 hours learning how to mask background in GIMP but it was worth everything. There's also the rare Approving Sid, but no one may ever see it after this again.
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Applause and pat on the back for the effort. Again and again and again. We have to pay you for those two hours.
 
I was inspired by @Anomaly's thread on Interpersonal questions to introduce a new philosophical problem that may be of interest.

What is the nature of pain? Is it physiological? Is it mental/psychological? Is it both?

Would we experience pain in the same way if we didn't have a mind?
 
Just want to mention that I wrote a paper on free will.

https://www.infjs.com/xfa-blog-entry/free-will.8052/

I read your entry. If I understand your argument correctly, you argue that free will (as generally understood) is a fallacy, because choice at any moment t is always a function of 1) circumstances and 2) moral constitution. In other words, choice is not really free, because it is always determined by a combination of circumstances and moral being (in the sense of one's moral constitution).

The weakness I see in this argument is that it assumes the truth of what it is seeking to demonstrate. I don't have an issue with the circumstances part of the equation, but it seems to me that the moral being part is problematic. You are assuming, from the start, that some people are essentially morally better than others. In other words, that some people are born 'morally good' and others not. Therefore the moral constitution of a person, in this interpretation, is not defined by their actions: rather, it is the constitution that determines the actions.

What this implies is that you already operate with a definition of moral constitution that excludes free will, prior to arriving at the conclusion that free will does not exist. Your deduction is something like this:

circumstances x moral constitution (excluding free will)choice (excluding free will)

Of course free will is going to be excluded, since its exclusion is presupposed in the definition of moral being. There is a circularity here, which can be seen from the fact that the exclusion of free will is on both sides of the arrow.

-----

As an aside, I think this view has problematic consequences as well. In this interpretation, moral improvement is impossible, because moral constitution is posited as an essence and therefore as a constant. I suppose this is compatible with the theory of predestination, and reflects the views of St. Augustine and Calvin. I am not rationally compelled by it, however.
 
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I read your entry. If I understand your argument correctly, you argue that free will (as generally understood) is a fallacy, because choice at any moment t is always a function of 1) circumstances and 2) moral constitution. In other words, choice is not really free, because it is always determined by a combination of circumstances and moral being (in the sense of one's moral constitution).

The weakness I see in this argument is that it assumes the truth of what it is seeking to demonstrate. I don't have an issue with the circumstances part of the equation, but it seems to me that the moral being part is problematic. You are assuming, from the start, that some people are essentially morally better than others. In other words, that some people are born 'morally good' and others not. Therefore the moral constitution of a person, in this interpretation, is not defined by their actions: rather, it is the constitution that determines the actions.

What this implies is that you already operate with a definition of moral constitution that excludes free will, prior to arriving at the conclusion that free will does not exist. Your deduction is something like this:

circumstances x moral constitution (excluding free will)choice (excluding free will)

Of course free will is going to be excluded, since its exclusion is presupposed in the definition of moral being. There is a circularity here, which can be seen from the fact that the exclusion of free will is on both sides of the arrow.

This is true, but we have evidence of moral character being different for different people. For instance, we know that people's behaviour is heavily influenced by brain structure and chemistry--traumatic injury to the prefrontal cortex can often greatly change someone's moral character, for instance. Given that a person's brain is influenced by genetics (although the traditional nature-nurture dichotomy has been shown to be a little too simple a model), this would imply that genes influence moral character.

Though I haven't looked through the exact studies, a quick look at wikipedia suggests experts agree here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behavioural_genetics#Genetic_influences_on_behaviour_are_pervasive .

Granted, this doesn't take into account the possibility of someone with the same circumstances and (relevant) genetics making different choices, but given how complex both are, such people would be hard to find.


As an aside, I think this view has problematic consequences as well. In this interpretation, moral improvement is impossible, because moral constitution is posited as an essence and therefore as a constant. I suppose this is compatible with the theory of predestination, and reflects the views of St. Augustine and Calvin. I am not rationally compelled by it, however.

One's moral constitution may be set in stone, but one's environment isn't. A person could improve their moral character by changing things about their life such that moral behaviours are more encouraged by things around them. Granted you'd still have to have the level of moral character required to start on that path, but a situation might happen in your life that pushes you in that direction as well (maybe you hit rock bottom, maybe you lose access to your vices for a little bit, maybe you have a really important conversation).
 
I was inspired by @Anomaly's thread on Interpersonal questions to introduce a new philosophical problem that may be of interest.

What is the nature of pain? Is it physiological? Is it mental/psychological? Is it both?

Would we experience pain in the same way if we didn't have a mind?
I have a lot of thoughts on this, but I've been trying to structure them into Te organization in order to better communicate them. I will answer this when I'm done pulling my thoughts out lol. It sounds more painful than it is. :sweatsmile: I just want to answer your questions as thoughtfully as I can.

Ps: Inspired by my thread? I'm honored to return the compliment, since you give me this gift (even unknowingly) every time we speak. : )
 
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