Karl Popper versus Thomas Kuhn

I read one of those articles you posted - the one by John Horgan - and he's an interesting character himself. He seems to be the Francis Fukuyama of science journalism, heralding the 'end of science' in one of his books (yep, published in the mid-90s).

In his article he kept comparing Kuhn with Popper, I think because he's enamoured with the idea that the ossification of scientific disciplines could result in the 'end' of discovery, and Kuhn is the most famous mouthpiece of that idea, with his 'idea' being its most succinct and articulate version.

It's clear that the Kuhn-Popper comparison is something close to Horgan's heart as a dyed-in-the-wool 'scientific postmodernist'. His selection of 'Popper' as a foil here is telling, I think, since Popper (and falsification) is a highly visible, well-known example used by popular science communicators/optimists/hardliners everywhere.

It seems more like a shot across the bows of his journalistic opponents than anything else. 'Your guy is Popper, mine is Kuhn'.


I'm not dismissing your discussion here, Ren, but maybe my dismissiveness betrays my own position - that I don't find postmodern challenges to truth particularly compelling or revelatory anymore. Whenever I come across something like this, I tend to think that the arguments are tired and trite and so roll my eyes at the attempt to muscle in on 'genuine' discourses. So by that logic, you'd have to put me in the Popper camp, lol, even though ironically Kuhm's idea is part of the general class of ideas that I am most interested in in the. WHOLE WIDE WORLD.

Yeah, it's possible that the source I shared with you was not the best example. There is no doubt that Kuhn is likely to be used by postmodernists in the way that you are describing in your post. I'm not sure that this all boils down to postmodernism, but you are certainly not the only one who thinks this. I'm still not sure where I myself stand exactly, I'm still exploring at this point.

Anyway, we'll see. Threads are organic things, and it seems that in the end people seem more interested in Popper himself than the 'versus' I put in the title to make the thread attractive. To be honest, if what happens is just a heightened interest in Popper, that suits me fine! :)
 
In a way he is saying that it's better for "truth" to make a bold claim that can be tested, than to make a cautious theory that cannot be disproved. it's better to be wrong, because it will lead to a "truer truth" down the line. I do really like that.
Exactly. In fact there's a fairly well-known modern article by a sociologist that (re-) argues exactly this because the way that professional standards have evolved is risking falsifiability.

It's called 'Fuck Nuance'.
 
Yeah, it's possible that the source I shared with you was not the best example. There is no doubt that Kuhn is likely to be used by postmodernists in the way that you are describing in your post. I'm not sure that this all boils down to postmodernism, but you are certainly not the only one who thinks this. I'm still not sure where I myself stand exactly, I'm still exploring at this point.

Anyway, we'll see. Threads are organic things, and it seems that in the end people seem more interested in Popper himself than the 'versus' I put in the title to make the thread attractive. To be honest, if what happens is just a heightened interest in Popper, that suits me fine! :)

I can try to comment on Kuhn. I'd say I don't necessarily agree with the idea that because theories rely on certain definitions, they're all equally true. Kuhn's idea of anomalies kind of works against this already, since you could argue that theories designed later, with more anomalies in mind, account for more things and thus are "truer". Though I guess you could argue that there's only a limited number of things a theory can account for, and thus to absorb some anomalies is to jettison others, but I would be skeptical of that claim.

I also think that since predictive power is really the most important part of any theory, the idea that a theory that allows you to do more with it is equally true as one that doesn't seems strange to me, even if "doing more" just means correctly guessing what you're going to see in X situation. Maybe it's a thing about the number of factors.
 
Yeah, it's possible that the source I shared with you was not the best example. There is no doubt that Kuhn is likely to be used by postmodernists in the way that you are describing in your post. I'm not sure that this all boils down to postmodernism, but you are certainly not the only one who thinks this. I'm still not sure where I myself stand exactly, I'm still exploring at this point.

Anyway, we'll see. Threads are organic things, and it seems that in the end people seem more interested in Popper himself than the 'versus' I put in the title to make the thread attractive. To be honest, if what happens is just a heightened interest in Popper, that suits me fine! :)
My opinion:

I like Popper, his ideas are sound, but to me IS (inductive-statistical) is a better and more useful description of 'science' than DN, and definitely in my personal experience.

The problem with DN (and 'falsification') is that you need a predictive theory to begin with in order to test, which actually doesn't account for a vast number of ideas we might otherwise refer to as 'hypotheses'.
 
Exactly. In fact there's a fairly well-known modern article by a sociologist that (re-) argues exactly this because the way that professional standards have evolved is risking falsifiability.

It's called 'Fuck Nuance'.

Nuance is tricky. It's a pretty vague term. I think that roughly speaking, it can be very usefully explored in literature, but not so much in the more rigorous scientific disciplines. In the latter cases nuance can be promoted at the expense of clarity.

There is much to be said in favour of a theory that abandons 'nuance' as an ideal in order to present a framework in its most naked, 'criticisable' form.
 
My opinion:

I like Popper, his ideas are sound, but to me IS (inductive-statistical) is a better and more useful description of 'science' than DN, and definitely in my personal experience.

The problem with DN (and 'falsification') is that you need a predictive theory to begin with in order to test, which actually doesn't account for a vast number of ideas we might otherwise refer to as 'hypotheses'.

My take: I really have to read more about DN and IS before I can tell you what I think :smile:

Thanks again for the link.
 
Nuance is tricky. It's a pretty vague term. I think that roughly speaking, it can be very usefully explored in literature, but not so much in the more rigorous scientific disciplines. In the latter cases nuance can be promoted at the expense of clarity.

There is much to be said in favour of a theory that abandons 'nuance' as an ideal in order to present a framework in its most naked, 'criticisable' form.

Yeah, I always use nuance is sport. When a team you support loses, it's easy to find a reason why they were unlucky, why "the best team lost" etc etc. It's very unscientific, but at the same time it has some validity, especially in an one off game. Perhaps not so much over the course of the season (due to bigger sample size, reversion to the mean and all that).

IS model also looks appealing (having read very briefly on it) and it's more intuitive for me. It's basically how we test hypothesis in statistics.
 
Something off topic that I wanted to mention: I hate it when people predict Trump victory in 2020 just because he won in 2016. "Models gave Hilary 80% of winning in 2016, yet what happened at the end!?"

Well, one trial doesn't disprove the model! It said Trump had 20% of winning: that's not 0%!

Just because the outcome of a single trial was unlikely, doesn't mean the next one will be as well.
 
Something off topic that I wanted to mention: I hate it when people predict Trump victory in 2020 just because he won in 2016. "Models gave Hilary 80% of winning in 2016, yet what happened at the end!?"

Well, one trial doesn't disprove the model! It said Trump had 20% of winning: that's not 0%!

Just because the outcome of a single trial was unlikely, doesn't mean the next one will be as well.

Yeah, it's dubious reasoning but who knows, maybe these people are trying to discourage others from voting against Trump by persuading them that nothing can be done. Sometimes the distorting of data interpretation is deliberate and ideological.
 
Yeah, it's dubious reasoning but who knows, maybe these people are trying to discourage others from voting against Trump by persuading them that nothing can be done. Sometimes the distorting of data interpretation is deliberate and ideological.

I don't think it's entirely Republican talking points though. My Dad hates Trump, but brings this point up a lot. I think some Democrats use this as a warning not to get complacent and to be prepared emotionally for another possible Trump victory.

That said, I don't think Trump will win. He won by pretty slim margins in the states that got him there, so you just have to be less hateable than Hillary, if even that given Coronavirus and all that.
 
My unprofessional, pretty much uninformed (and open to a change of mind) intuitive reaction:
Based on what I understand, I would agree with Popper when it comes to determining what is science.
However, I think Kuhn's philosophy is correct when it comes to determining "truth".
That's because I don't believe everything that is true can be scientifically proven.

(Perhaps this is similar to some of what you are saying already? The terminology used is usually over my head, although I do find these topics interesting.)
 
I don't think it's entirely Republican talking points though. My Dad hates Trump, but brings this point up a lot. I think some Democrats use this as a warning not to get complacent and to be prepared emotionally for another possible Trump victory.

That's a very good point actually, weirdly I hadn't thought of the flipside of what I was saying :smile:

Assuming Trump might win is important so as not to get complacent. Hopefully everyone with Democratic sympathies will vote this time around.
 
I also think that since predictive power is really the most important part of any theory, the idea that a theory that allows you to do more with it is equally true as one that doesn't seems strange to me, even if "doing more" just means correctly guessing what you're going to see in X situation. Maybe it's a thing about the number of factors.

I'm fine with saying they are equally true. Imagine you're discussing a particular topic with two people (A and B). Both make propositions about the topic in question that are true, but B's point is much more enlightening and interesting. Will you say that B's point is more true than A's? Likely not—you might just say that A's point is true but trivial, that it doesn't really illuminate the discussion in any new way, etc.

The same applies to theories as whole, I think, since after all, theories are just unified collections of propositions.
 
Based on what I understand, I would agree with Popper when it comes to determining what is science.
However, I think Kuhn's philosophy is correct when it comes to determining "truth".

I'm not sure that siding with Popper on science and siding with Kuhn on truth are completely reconcilable positions. They might be. The trouble is that Popper seems to work with a non-redescribable conception of truth. He couldn't say that "science's aim is to get closer and closer to the truth" if, at certain points throughout history, the very notion of truth could be reconceptualised so as to have a different meaning from the meaning it used to have. But it seems that a consequence of Kuhn's theory of paradigms is that each paradigm can understand truth in a way that is not directly translatable into the terms of another paradigm. So if the history of science is the history of successive paradigms, we would have to assume that the notion of truth itself has changed over the course of history.

It is in fact clear that the concept of truth has evolved over the course of history. For example, according to Heidegger, the Ancient Greeks understood truth as ἀλήθεια (aletheia or 'unconcealment') which is very different from, say, truth in the sense of a theory being confirmed (or not yet disproved) by scientific experiment. What could be argued, though, is that the different concepts of truth are historically convergent—i.e. they are heading towards the one genuine concept which will not be surpassed because it is final. I'm just not sure that Kuhn would sit comfortably with that idea, because if a certain series of paradigms converges towards a final set of concepts, then would it not mean that the paradigm itself is final? Also, if concepts are historically convergent, then paradigms must be inter-translatable in some way, but Kuhn doesn't seem to accept this since he defends an incommensurability thesis:

"In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn asserts that there are important shifts in the meanings of key terms as a consequence of a scientific revolution ... This is important, because a standard conception of the transition from classical to relativistic physics is that although Einstein’s theory of relativity supersedes Newton’s theory, what we have is an improvement or generalization whereby Newton’s theory is a special case of Einstein’s (to a close approximation). We can say that the later theory is closer to the truth than the older theory. Kuhn’s view that ‘mass’ as used by Newton cannot be translated by ‘mass’ as used by Einstein allegedly renders this kind of comparison impossible. Hence incommensurability is supposed to rule out convergent realism, the view that science shows ever improving approximation to the truth." (Stanford Encyclopedia)

If Popper and Kuhn disagree on convergent realism, then that would suggest an important disagreement. I see three possible alternatives: Kuhn is wrong; Kuhn is right; Kuhn can be interpreted in such a way as to show that there is no real problem.

That's because I don't believe everything that is true can be scientifically proven.

What would be an example of something true that can't be scientifically proven? Religious truth, perhaps?

An interesting question here would be whether this kind of truth means the same thing as truth in the scientific sense, and that what differs is not the meaning of truth but only the 'method' for arriving at it.
 
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In relation to this discussion, this is a very interesting video/lecture for those who are courageous:

 
Interesting. So theory that wants to be scientific has to be falsifiable? So flat-earth theory is scientific, because it's falsifiable?

What does it even mean to be falsifiable? Some theories cannot be disproved with 100% certainty - is it enough if a hypothesis is rejected with 90, 95 or 99% certainty (like in stats)? Is it enough if it's disproven only by the means of logical argument?

Maybe I am still thinking too much in terms of theories in natural science. I know you made a video about why MBTI is science. I will re-watch that.

But pending further evidence, I will side with Popper for now. I know I haven't even come to the point where they differ - I want to understand the criterion of falsifiability first.

After reading through this discussion, I think you have a somewhat better understanding of Popper. @Ren did a really good job, but there are a few things I want to add.

According to the criterion of demarcation, we can never be 100 percent certain that our theories are "true". Although truth is most certainly possible, certain and absolute truth are not. To understand what this means, we need to explore Poppers philosophy a little. His entire epistemology stems from one basic assumption: that all humans are fallible. That we are all prone to error, and that therefore we can be certain of nothing. In the pursuit of truth, our fallibility opens us up to mistakes. Because we are fallible, we are going to make mistakes, and there is nothing we can do about it. But if we are flawed, how is truth possible? How is it that we can even begin to distinguish truth from fiction? This, roughly speaking, is the problem Poppers epistemology tries to solve.

Popper explains the only way to overcome our fallibility is through the process of "conjecture and criticism", of "trial and error". Whenever we observe an anomaly that has no explanation, what we will naturally do is guess. We will make a bold conjecture about what we think the explanation might be. If the power suddenly goes out in your home, you might guess that the power is down on the entire street. That every house in your neighborhood also has no electricity. You might test your conjecture by going outside and looking at your neighbors houses. If its dark, and you see no lights, you might feel comfortable with your conclusion. But you could be wrong. There might be an alternative explanation why all the lights are out. It might just be a freak coincidence. Indeed, the real explanation why your power went out might be that your power company has simply cut you off because of an overdue bill. But those are not your only options, there are more. The circuits in your house might be damaged, you may have blown a fuse, an EMP could have blown all the electricals in your house. Admittedly, the last three possibilities are not very realistic, but this is not important. What's important here is that you see there is always more than one possible explanation; one possible conjecture. With every anomaly, there are always multiple competing explanations. Your goal, as a rational agent, is to find a way of ruling them out.

This is where criticism becomes important. In the example above, you may have walked outside to prove your hypothesis. You may think that the observation "all the lights on my street are out" is a piece of confirming evidence that aught to make you more confident in your conjecture. As if hypotheses are confirmed by piling evidence for or against competing options. This attitude, Popper claims, is irrational. We won't get into the reasons here, however, he says that the true purpose of evidence is to rule out competing explanations. This idea that we use it to "confirm" hypotheses is a misconception. When you see that all the lights on your street are out, it is more rational to consider it as a refutation of other hypotheses; that it rules out the possibility that your power company cut you off, or that you blew a fuse somewhere. Well actually, if you're anything like me, this claim should make you feel a little uneasy. If you feel that this argument is too simple or too clean, then you should trust your instincts. Because as I've presented his argument here, it IS too simple and too clean. Surely, you might be thinking, the observation that "all the lights on the street are out" is not enough to rule out the possibility that your power has been cut off. Surely claiming that we have successfully narrowed down our options to only one tenable conjecture is itself irrational. If indeed this is what you are thinking, then you are correct. Gold star!

In reality, the only way to narrow down your options is through argument. Not through evidence, not through induction, not through intuition or instinct, but rather through argument. Only argument ever justifies anything, and only argument can ever be used to rule out competing explanations. However, since all humans are fallible and prone to error, even these refutations must be accepted only tentatively. Not only can we never be sure of anything we know, we can also never be sure of our criticisms and refutations. Above I explained that the only way to overcome fallibility is through conjecture and criticism. The reason is that the process of narrowing down your options helps you to overcome error. Whenever you look for evidence, you are looking for ways or "eliminating" mistaken conjectures. For ways of removing irrational hypotheses. Indeed, all of your efforts may be mistaken. You might not just be mistaken in your hypotheses, but also in what you believe is necessary to rule them out. And this is where the beauty of science steps in. One individual might not have much of a chance discovering truth. But with a whole community of rational minded individuals with the single minded pursuit of discovering true theories, we have a much better chance of eventually getting there. Better to use a whole community of super computers rather than just one. The truth may be hard to find, but working together we have at least a glimmer of hope to overcome our flaws and fallibilities. I hope this makes sense.
 
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After reading through this discussion, I think you have a somewhat better understanding of Popper. @Ren did a really good job, but there are a few things I want to add.

According to the criterion of demarcation, we can never be 100 percent certain that our theories are "true". Although truth is most certainly possible, certain and absolute truth are not. To understand what this means, we need to explore Poppers philosophy a little. His entire epistemology stems from one basic assumption: that all humans are fallible. That we are all prone to error, and that therefore we can be certain of nothing. In the pursuit of truth, our fallibility opens us up to mistakes. Because we are fallible, we are going to make mistakes, and there is nothing we can do about it. But if we are flawed, how is truth possible? How is it that we can even begin to distinguish truth from fiction? This, roughly speaking, is the problem Poppers epistemology tries to solve.

Popper explains the only way to overcome our fallibility is through the process of "conjecture and criticism", of "trial and error". Whenever we observe an anomaly that has no explanation, what we will naturally do is guess. We will make a bold conjecture about what we think the explanation might be. If the power suddenly goes out in your home, you might guess that the power is down on the entire street. You might test your conjecture by going outside and looking at your neighbors houses. If its dark, and you see no lights, you might feel comfortable with your conclusion. But you could be wrong. There might be an alternative explanation why all the lights are out. It might just be a freak coincidence. Indeed, the real explanation why your power went out might be that your power company has simply cut you off because of an overdue bill. But those are not your only options, there are more. The circuits in your house might be damaged, you may have blown a fuse, an EMP could have blown all the electricals in your house. Admittedly, the last three possibilities are not very realistic, but this is not important. What's important here is that you see there is always more than one possible explanation; one possible conjecture. With every anomaly, there are always multiple competing explanations. Your goal, as a rational agent, is to find a way of ruling them out.

This is where criticism becomes important. In the example above, you may have walked outside to prove your hypothesis. You may think that the observation "all the lights on my street are out" is a piece of confirming evidence that aught to make you more confident in your conjecture. As if hypotheses are confirmed by piling evidence for or against competing options. This attitude, Popper claims, is irrational. We won't get into the reasons here, however, he says that the true purpose of evidence is to rule out competing explanations. This idea that we use it to "confirm" hypotheses is a misconception. When you see that all the lights on your street are out, it is more rational to consider it as a refutation of other hypotheses; that it rules out the possibility that your power company cut you off, or that you blew a fuse somewhere. Well actually, if you're anything like me, this claim should make you feel a little uneasy. If you feel that this argument is too simple or too clean, then you should trust your instincts. Because as I've presented his argument here, it IS too simple and too clean. Surely, you might be thinking, the observation that "all the lights on the street are out" is not enough to rule out the possibility that your power has been cut off. Surely claiming that we have successfully narrowed down our options to only one tenable conjecture is itself irrational. If indeed this is what you are thinking, then you are correct. Gold star!

In reality, the only way to narrow down your options is through argument. Not through evidence, not through induction, not through intuition or instinct, but rather through argument. Only argument ever justifies anything, and only argument can ever be used to rule out competing explanations. However, since all humans are fallible and prone to error, even these refutations must be accepted only tentatively. Not only can we never be sure of anything we know, we can also never be sure of our criticisms and refutations. Above I explained that the only way to overcome fallibility is through conjecture and criticism. The reason is that the process of narrowing down your options helps you to overcome error. Whenever you look for evidence, you are looking for ways or "eliminating" mistaken conjectures. For ways of removing irrational hypotheses. Indeed, all of your efforts may be mistaken. You might not just be mistaken in your hypotheses, but also in what you believe is necessary to rule them out. And this is where the beauty of science steps in. One individual might not have much of a chance discovering truth. But a whole community of rational minded individuals with the single minded pursuit of discovering true theories, we have a much better chance of eventually getting there. Better to use a whole community of super computers rather than just one.

Wow, thanks for this wolly. I look forward to digging into your post later!
 
The problem with DN (and 'falsification') is that you need a predictive theory to begin with in order to test, which actually doesn't account for a vast number of ideas we might otherwise refer to as 'hypotheses'.

This interpretation of Popper isn't exactly correct. Yes he says that hypotheses are scientific if and only if only they are falsifiable. However, he never said that non falsifiable theories are also non refutable. Neither did he say that they should be ignored. Its perfectly rational for scientists to discuss and debate hypotheses that are not yet falsifiable. In fact, a vast majority of scientific theories begin their life as a kind of philosophical hypothesis. Its only later when technology improves that scientists will discover a way of testing them through experiment.
 
This interpretation of Popper isn't exactly correct. Yes he says that hypotheses are scientific if and only if only they are falsifiable. However, he never said that non falsifiable theories are also non refutable. Neither did he say that they should be ignored. Its perfectly rational for scientists to discuss and debate hypotheses that are not yet falsifiable. In fact, a vast majority of scientific theories begin their life as a kind of philosophical hypothesis. Its only later when technology improves that scientists will discover a way of testing them through experiment.

This suggests an interesting and important distinction between:

1) Theories that are currently not but may become falsifiable; and
2) Theories whose own internal structure makes them unfalsifiable. (I think Popper would place psychoanalysis in this category).
 
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