Karl Popper versus Thomas Kuhn

Ren said:
This suggests an interesting and important distinction between:

1) Theories that are currently not but may become falsifiable; and
2) Theories whose own internal structure makes them unfalsifiable. (I think Popper would place psychoanalysis in this category).
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Yes, exactly. Although, I would change unfalsifiable to unrefutable. There's nothing wrong with presenting unfalsifiable hypotheses. But if they're irrefutable, then according to Popper, they are just nonsense. What do you think though?
 
philostam said:
Oh, wow, I see. This made it much clearer. I already downloaded some introductory podcasts about this Popper guy, because I find this interesting.

In a way he is saying that it's better for "truth" to make a bold claim that can be tested, than to make a cautious theory that cannot be disproved. it's better to be wrong, because it will lead to a "truer truth" down the line. I do really like that.

Quickly reading his Wikipedia page, I see he also has problem with induction. This is also something I have a problem with, so it will be interesting to read his thoughts. I feel Ti is deductive, while Ni is more inductive. I am always baffled when people make predictions.
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That's right. He covers a refutation of induction in The Logic of Scientific discovery. Here is a summary of Poppers views, written by DavidD Deutsch.

David Deutsch said:
It is hard to know where to begin in criticizing the inductivist conception of science - it is so profoundly false in so many different ways. Perhaps the worst flaw, from my point of view, is the sheer non sequitur that a generalized prediction is tantamount to a new theory. Like all scientific theories of any depth, the theory that there are parallel universes simply does not have the form of a generalization from the observations. Did we observe first one universe, then a second and a third, and then induce that there are trillions of them? Was the generalization that planets will 'wander' round the sky in one pattern rather than another, equivalent to the theory that planets are worlds, in orbit round the Sun, and that the Earth is one of them? It is also not true that repeating our observations is the way in which we become convinced of scientific theories. As I have said, theories are explanations, not merely predictions. If one does not accept a proposed explanation of a set of observations, making the observations over and over again is seldom the remedy. Still less can it help us to create a satisfactory explanation when we cannot think of one at all.

Furthermore, even mere predictions can never be justified by observational evidence, as Bertrand Russell, illustrated in his story of the chicken. (To avoid any possible misunderstanding, let me stress that this was a metaphorical, anthropomorphic chicken, representing a human being trying to understand the regularities of the universe.) The chicken noticed that the farmer came every day to feed it. It predicted that the farmer would continue to bring food every day. Inductivists think that the chicken had 'extrapolated' its observations into a theory, and that each feeding time added justification to that theory. Then one day the farmer came and wrung the chicken's neck. The disappointment experienced by Russell's chicken has also been experienced by trillions of other chickens. This inductively justifies the conclusion that induction cannot justify any conclusions!

However, this line of criticism lets inductivism off far too lightly. It does illustrate the fact that repeated observations cannot justify theories, but in doing so it entirely misses (or rather, accepts) a more basic misconception: namely, that the inductive extrapolation of observations to form new theories is even possible. In fact, it is {60} impossible to extrapolate observations unless one has already placed them within an explanatory framework. For example, in order to 'induce' its false prediction, Russell's chicken must first have had in mind a false explanation of the farmer's behaviour. Perhaps it guessed that the farmer harboured benevolent feelings towards chickens. Had it guessed a different explanation - that the farmer was trying to fatten the chickens up for slaughter, for instance - it would have 'extrapolated' the behaviour differently. Suppose that one day the farmer starts bringing the chickens more food than usual. How one extrapolates this new set of observations to predict the farmer's future behaviour depends entirely on how one explains it. According to the benevolent-farmer theory, it is evidence that the farmer's benevolence towards chickens has increased, and that therefore the chickens have even less to worry about than before. But according to the fattening-up theory, the behaviour is ominous - it is evidence that slaughter is imminent.

The fact that the same observational evidence can be 'extrapolated' to give two diametrically opposite predictions according to which explanation one adopts, and cannot justify either of them, is not some accidental limitation of the farmyard environment: it is true of all observational evidence under all circumstances. Observations could not possibly play either of the roles assigned to them in the inductivist scheme, even in respect of mere predictions, let alone genuine explanatory theories. Admittedly, inductivism is based on the common-sense theory of the growth of knowledge - that we learn from experience - and historically it was associated with the liberation of science from dogma and tyranny. But if we want to understand the true nature of knowledge, and its place in the fabric of reality, we must face up to the fact that inductivism is false, root and branch. No scientific reasoning, and indeed no successful reasoning of any kind, has ever fitted the inductivist description.
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wolly.green said:
The fabric of reality!
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I don't really like his interpretation of Popper. Deutsch thinks that if a theory wasn't devised to solve an explicit, agreed upon problem, then it isn't rational. What he doesn't realize is that the process of theorizing and problem formulation sometimes happens together. As we know, scientist simultaneously theorize and update the problems they think they are solving...

Forgive me if I am misunderstanding him, its just I he says things that I know are not, strictly speaking Popperian!
 
Aaron Thyne said:
wasn't devised to solve an explicit, agreed upon problem, then it isn't rational. What he doesn't realize is that the process of theorizing and problem formulation sometimes happens together. As we know, scientist simultaneously theorize and update the problems they think they are solving...

Forgive me if I am misunderstanding him, its just I he says things that I know are not, strictly speaking
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No, this is exactly what he says. At the very beginning of The Beginning of Infinity, there is a diagram showing the relationship between problem formulation and theory. It matches exactly what Popper had in mind. I have a feeling you mean something different though...
 
wolly.green said:
No, this is exactly what he says. At the very beginning of The Beginning of Infinity, there is a diagram showing the relationship between problem formulation and theory. It matches exactly what Popper had in mind. I have a feeling you mean something different though...
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That's not quite what I mean. I am a little intoxicated right now, so I'll get back to you tomorrow! Im certain you are drunk as well though.
 
Aaron Thyne said:
That's not quite what I mean. I am a little intoxicated right now, so I'll get back to you tomorrow! Im certain you are drunk as well though.
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Not even close mate. I was going to call you something else, but we should leave that to locker rooms. :laughing::laughing:

Anyway, let me take a jab at what I think you mean. Scientists formulate theories to solve "problems". These problems could be anything from an anomaly in experimental measurements, to some sort of inconsistency between a theory in physics and a theory in chemistry. Since these clashes require explaining, a scientist will get to work formulating a hypothesis. However, at every moment, those scientists could be wrong about the problem they think they are trying to explain. Maybe the measuring instrument was faulty, and the anomaly was merely a side affect of the fault. Or maybe a physics professor misunderstood the chemistry theory he was elevating as problematic. Whatever the case, all scientists could be mistaken about the problem they think they are solving.

However, and here's the annoying nuance, just because a perceived problem changes, does not mean the theory is wrong. Just because a scientist was wrong about the problem he thought he was solving, does not mean that his hypothesis is automatically irrational. In fact, most new hypotheses are nothing more than ad hoc modifications of old theories. Albeit, modifications that are rather drastic and almost deserving of Kuhns title of "incommensurable". No matter the details, they are an evolution of old theories. The essence of new theories is always inherited, at least in part, from the framework of old theories. This fixation on separating problems from solutions isn't as distinctive as Deutsch thinks. Is this what you are getting at?

edit: Also @Ren what do you think?
 
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wolly.green said:
Not even close mate. I was going to call you something else, but we should leave that to locker rooms. :laughing::laughing:

Anyway, let me take a jab at what I think you mean. Scientists formulate theories to solve "problems". These problems could be anything from an anomaly in experimental measurements, to some sort of inconsistency between a theory in physics and a theory in chemistry. Since these clashes require explaining, a scientist will get to work formulating a hypothesis. However, at every moment, those scientists could be wrong about the problem they think they are trying to explain. Maybe the measuring instrument was faulty, and the anomaly was merely a side affect of the fault. Or maybe a physics professor misunderstood the chemistry theory he was elevating as problematic. Whatever the case, all scientists could be mistaken about the problem they think they are solving.

However, and here's the annoying nuance, just because a perceived problem changes, does not mean the theory is wrong. Just because a scientist was wrong about the problem he thought he was solving, does not mean that his hypothesis is automatically irrational. In fact, most new hypotheses are nothing more than ad hoc modifications of old theories. Albeit, modifications that are rather drastic and almost deserving of Kuhns title of "incommensurable". No matter the details, they are an evolution of old theories. The essence of new theories is always inherited, at least in part, from the framework of old theories. This fixation on separating problems from solutions isn't as distinctive as Deutsch thinks. Is this what you are getting at?

edit: Also @Ren what do you think?
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Ah, yes yes. That's exactly what I mean. I may not have given Deutsch a fair trial. My bad. I shall actually finish his book next time and not get annoyed before giving him a fair hearing.
 
Aaron Thyne said:
Ah, yes yes. That's exactly what I mean. I may not have given Deutsch a fair trial. My bad. I shall actually finish his book next time and not get annoyed before giving him a fair hearing.
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That's literally all I've ever asked for. Honestly, Deutsch is even better than Popper. He's improved on Poppers philosophy in so many different ways its like sucking on sweet sweet cotton candy! Ok, maybe I'm a little boozed up...
 
Aaron Thyne said:
By the way @Ren , I wanted to commend you on your fluid knowledge of Popper. Your summary is both comprehensive and comprehendible. :grinning:
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Thanks! I am not an expert but I try to have a good working knowledge of as many important philosophers as possible.

Popper has the merit of writing in clear language and using jargon only when necessary, so my sense is that to understand him one only has to read his books. Unfortunately, the same can't be said of a lot of philosophers, whose books need in turn to be 'interpreted' by a further string of experts.
 
Ren said:
Thanks! I am not an expert but I try to have a good working knowledge of as many important philosophers as possible.

Popper has the merit of writing in clear language and using jargon only when necessary, so my sense is that to understand him one only has to read his books. Unfortunately, the same can't be said of a lot of philosophers, whose books need in turn to be 'interpreted' by a further string of experts.
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This is alarmingly true. In particular, Wittgenstein comes to mind. I find Popper very easy to understand as well. His language is not just clear. But also concise.

Anyway, despite his strengths, he is still widely misunderstood. In particular, his epistemology is misinterpreted as the opposite of verificationism. It is not, and you seem to understand that, which is unusual.
 
Ren said:
Thanks! I am not an expert but I try to have a good working knowledge of as many important philosophers as possible.

Popper has the merit of writing in clear language and using jargon only when necessary, so my sense is that to understand him one only has to read his books. Unfortunately, the same can't be said of a lot of philosophers, whose books need in turn to be 'interpreted' by a further string of experts.
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What happened to Near! He wasn't quite as awesome as L, but still fucking awesome!
 
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Aaron Thyne said:
Anyway, despite his strengths, he is still widely misunderstood. In particular, his epistemology is misinterpreted as the opposite of verificationism. It is not, and you seem to understand that, which is unusual.
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I think that anyone who has read Conjectures and Refutations should be equipped to avoid this misinterpretation, because in it Popper emphasises numerous times (really quite a lot, which indicates that he was aware of the misinterpretation) that his epistemology is not 'opposite' to verificationism. He even describes in detail how many of his conversations with Carnap were productive and led Carnap to update verificationism, though never quite as far as Popper would have liked. If Popper had thought of his epistemology as opposite to Carnap's, he would simply have encouraged Carnap to drop verificationism altogether.

I think the differences in approach look something like this:

1) Carnap thought nature speaks the truth by itself if we make sure to 'read' it non-metaphysically;
2) Popper thought we can't sit back but have to engage and test nature to make it yield (tentative) truths;
3) Kuhn thought there are as many 'truths of nature' as there are possible paradigms for interpreting nature.

So in a way, Carnap and Popper agree (against Kuhn, it seems to me) that truth isn't something that is merely relative to a scheme. Where they differ is in their approach to 'getting closer to' that truth. Carnap seems to think there can be a scheme (the unified universal scientific language or whatever) that will eventually just directly translate the truth of nature,* whereas Popper thinks of schemes as tools of trial and error rather than of direct representation. But I don't think either of them questions that there is something called objective truth, whether it be accessible directly or only indirectly.

*I even found passages in Quine where he seems to subscribe to that view, e.g. where he speaks of scientific language as 'limning the ultimate structure of reality'. I'm not sure if Quine eventually abandoned that view or stuck to it throughout his career.
 
wolly.green said:
What happened to Near! He wasn't quite as awesome as L, but still fucking awesome!
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Near will be back :p But at the moment I'm siding with Gowther from the anime 7 Deadly Sins, who is also a pretty awesome character.
 
Ren said:
I think that anyone who has read Conjectures and Refutations should be equipped to avoid this misinterpretation, because in it Popper emphasises numerous times (really quite a lot, which indicates that he was aware of the misinterpretation) that his epistemology is not 'opposite' to verificationism. He even describes in detail how many of his conversations with Carnap were productive and led Carnap to update verificationism, though never quite as far as Popper would have liked. If Popper had thought of his epistemology as opposite to Carnap's, he would simply have encouraged Carnap to drop verificationism altogether.

I think the differences in approach look something like this:

1) Carnap thought nature speaks the truth by itself if we make sure to 'read' it non-metaphysically;
2) Popper thought we can't sit back but have to engage and test nature to make it yield (tentative) truths;
3) Kuhn thought there are as many 'truths of nature' as there are possible paradigms for interpreting nature.

So in a way, Carnap and Popper agree (against Kuhn, it seems to me) that truth isn't something that is merely relative to a scheme. Where they differ is in their approach to 'getting closer to' that truth. Carnap seems to think there can be a scheme (the unified universal scientific language or whatever) that will eventually just directly translate the truth of nature,* whereas Popper thinks of schemes as tools of trial and error rather than of direct representation. But I don't think either of them questions that there is something called objective truth, whether it be accessible directly or only indirectly.

*I even found passages in Quine where he seems to subscribe to that view, e.g. where he speaks of scientific language as 'limning the ultimate structure of reality'. I'm not sure if Quine eventually abandoned that view or stuck to it throughout his career.
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Aaron is really drunk. He vomited on the carpet, the dick. Now he wants me to type. I'll get back to you tomorrow @Ren . Have a good night.
 
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