Reason vs Violence

[wolly.green]

Would reason work with North Korea? Would powerful words make it a better place for the vast amounts of people living in there and stop the race with nuclear weapons? I really do want to know what it is that which would turn that into something good. Sure one can think and believe it will sort itself out one shiny day. Let there be a civil war and all will turn out just fine. Is it morally in any way acceptable to see others use their views and ideals as the means of oppression? Is it all good to wait for something to happen, for them to find reason as well? I feel like not, not ever. Reason that would resonate in that madness is a dream that doesn't exist. Violence is all good to me if it aims for allowing freedom of choice for people.

Good is no good at all for others if it's left by itself. If we lay people out as plain good and bad, the bad will have no problem with fighting. The purest and best of people would rather choose morals and dignity at the time of fight, and also die with them.


At the time of nazi Germany they couldn't be just convinced no more, it was too late. I wish it could have, but it had to be sorted out with a lot of violence. They needed more than convincing to turn back from that route. I wouldn't go as far as convincing others is always bad. No matter if the problem was political or concrete, if you have the knowledge of what will happen then you must convince. If your friend was jumping off a cliff, you wouldn't convince him not to? If you could meet Hitler and convince him that he would be one of the most hated persons in human history you wouldn't? I think it's quite naive to think that people will find their way no matter what they are heading into. Even children need convincing sometimes to do the right thing. I'm not saying that there isn't wisdom to be found in doing what is wrong, but sometimes it is plain ignorant to let those mistakes happen.

Dude are you serious? I literally JUST went over this. To save time, I'm just going to copy and paste what I said in my last comment.

"You mentioned that Algeria did not gain independence by using only reason, and that women had to use force to win their right to vote. I can see what you mean when you imply that these are two good examples of 'virtuous violence'. Although it certainly IS true that women had to fight for their right to vote, I would like you to consider another way understanding this.

In both scenarios there are two opposing sets of ideas. In the one case, you have the idea that Swiss women deserve to vote coming into direct conflict with the idea that they do not. In the other case, you have the idea that Algeria deserves independance coming into direct conflict with the idea that they do not. Both cases, although unique, are very similar in structure. Both involve the oppression of one group by another. And both involve substantial loss of freedom. This is important because freedom is absolutely necessary for knowledge to grow; this conclusion just follows from Karl Poppers epistemology. Thus freedom is one of those things that is necessary to find solutions to issues. By preventing Swiss women from voting, their government is suppressing their capacity solve problems. This is supremely immoral because it means these women are effectively disabled from improving their own lives, or securing their own future. In such an oppressive situation, their violence is just a form of self defence; which in my opinion is the only exception to the rule that 'violence is always immoral'. The same argument can be formulated for the case of Alegrias independence"

The examples you gave with North Korea and Hilter are just examples of situations where it is rational to use self defence.

 

[Disguised]

Dude are you serious? I literally JUST went over this. To save time, I'm just going to copy and paste what I said in my last comment.

"You mentioned that Algeria did not gain independence by using only reason, and that women had to use force to win their right to vote. I can see what you mean when you imply that these are two good examples of 'virtuous violence'. Although it certainly IS true that women had to fight for their right to vote, I would like you to consider another way understanding this.

In both scenarios there are two opposing sets of ideas. In the one case, you have the idea that Swiss women deserve to vote coming into direct conflict with the idea that they do not. In the other case, you have the idea that Algeria deserves independance coming into direct conflict with the idea that they do not. Both cases, although unique, are very similar in structure. Both involve the oppression of one group by another. And both involve substantial loss of freedom. This is important because freedom is absolutely necessary for knowledge to grow; this conclusion just follows from Karl Poppers epistemology. Thus freedom is one of those things that is necessary to find solutions to issues. By preventing Swiss women from voting, their government is suppressing their capacity solve problems. This is supremely immoral because it means these women are effectively disabled from improving their own lives, or securing their own future. In such an oppressive situation, their violence is just a form of self defence; which in my opinion is the only exception to the rule that 'violence is always immoral'. The same argument can be formulated for the case of Alegrias independence"

The examples you gave with North Korea and Hilter are just examples of situations where it is rational to use self defence.

Hey dude, I saw your point there and didn't quote but the idea of convincing you shared. Chill out.

I see your point of self defense, agreed to it, but it actions were made after they found the courage to do it, after getting oppressed enough. There wasn't many others outside the country were there? If the only exception to this rule of yours is self defense then I don't think it is very moral, that is my opinion. If we would only protect ourselves it would be an egoistic world for sure. Defending people by the limits of our national borders. With this theory violence in North Korea is all good if they do it, but no one else involves in it. We do think alike sure, but I do feel like violence used to protect and guide is necessary. Even ISIS got way out of hand when violence was the only thing that bothered people in correcting something that spreaded like a plague.

 

[wolly.green]

I see your point of self defense, agreed to it, but it actions were made after they found the courage to do it, after getting oppressed enough. There wasn't many others outside the country were there? If the only exception to this rule of yours is self defense then I don't think it is very moral, that is my opinion. If we would only protect ourselves it would be an egoistic world for sure.

I'm glad you bought this up! What i think you're trying to say is this: "Algerians did not achieve liberation on their own. They needed significant help from others outside of the country. But for those others, this help is not self defense. Not even close. Those others are fighting for what they think is right. They are not fighting to secure their own freedom. Therefore, it follows that 'self defense' is not the only legitimate use of violence". If by self defense, you mean something like "to protect ones own interests against force or coercion", you might have a point. But this particular definition is far too simplistic in my opinion.

Remember above I explained that violence is really about ideas. I said that violence is just one means of resolving conflicting ideas. Now if I am correct about this, then self defense must ALSO be about ideas. Or more specifically, when one acts in self defense, one is acting to prevent the oppression of his idea by another. In this case, the Algerians are trying to prevent their ideas of freedom and Independence from being suppressed by the opposition -- they are acting in self defense. Now I have suggested that this "idea" belongs to Algerians only. But in reality, it actually belongs to anyone that happens to agree with it. In this case, it also belongs to those others that lie outside of Algerian boarders.

Given how I chose to define self defense here, it follows that those others that lie outside of Algeria are ALSO acting in self defense. They are acting in self defense because they are trying to prevent their ideas from being suppressed.This might sound perverse; but it follows necessarily from the claim that violence is fundamentally about resolving conflicting ideas.

 

[Ren]

Remember above I explained that violence is really about ideas. I said that violence is just one means of resolving conflicting ideas. Now if I am correct about this, then self defense must ALSO be about ideas. Or more specifically, when one acts in self defense, one is acting to prevent the oppression of his idea by another. In this case, the Algerians are trying to prevent their ideas of freedom and Independence from being suppressed by the opposition -- they are acting in self defense. Now I have suggested that this "idea" belongs to Algerians only. But in reality, it actually belongs to anyone that happens to agree with it. In this case, it also belongs to those others that lie outside of Algerian borders.

Interesting strategy! I am honestly not sure that all conflicts are conflicts about ideas. But supposing this holds, I think it still tends to show that violence simply isn't always immoral (we haven't defined our ethical axioms but let's take them for granted for now).

You built an argument around the notion that violence as a means to resolve conflicting ideas is always bad (I'm wont repeat the argument here) with one exception: self-defence in cases of oppression. Purely in the abstract, I think this can work on the condition that it be internally consistent, and that the exception remain a genuine exception, like an outlier in a model.

But your permissive definition of self-defense has now become so broad that it hardly qualifies as an exception anymore. I could reformulate the argument thus: "Violence is always immoral, except in cases of self-defense against the oppression of ideas which happens every day in a structurally unequal world." But then, the natural conclusion to draw from this is that violence is not always immoral at all.

Maybe a solution would be to define a threshold of oppression past which self-defense in the form of violence becomes legitimate, but "before" which it is not, and we should still rely on reasoned argument only to solve the conflict. That way, we may preserve the exception. Thoughts?

 

[wolly.green]

Interesting strategy! I am honestly not sure that all conflicts are conflicts about ideas. But supposing this holds, I think it still tends to show that violence simply isn't always immoral (we haven't defined our ethical axioms but let's take them for granted for now).

You built an argument around the notion that violence as a means to resolve conflicting ideas is always bad (I'm wont repeat the argument here) with one exception: self-defence in cases of oppression. Purely in the abstract, I think this can work on the condition that it be internally consistent, and that the exception remain a genuine exception, like an outlier in a model.

But your permissive definition of self-defense has now become so broad that it hardly qualifies as an exception anymore. I could reformulate the argument thus: "Violence is always immoral, except in cases of self-defense against the oppression of ideas which happens every day in a structurally unequal world." But then, the natural conclusion to draw from this is that violence is not always immoral at all.

Maybe a solution would be to define a threshold of oppression past which self-defense in the form of violence becomes legitimate, but "before" which it is not, and we should still rely on reasoned argument only to solve the conflict. That way, we may preserve the exception. Thoughts?

Haha hi. I don't think your definition is as rediculous as it seems. You said that this sort of oppression happens all the time in a structurally unequal world. But why is this rediculous? Suppose some group discovers their own oppression. Further suppose that we know with absolute certainty that this group really is oppressed. No matter the oppositions ignorance, our hypothetical groups violence really is in self defence.. This works unless you are thinking about something else?

 

[Ren]

Haha hi. I don't think your definition is as rediculous as it seems. You said that this sort of oppression happens all the time in a structurally unequal world. But why is this rediculous? Suppose some group discovers their own oppression. Further suppose that we know with absolute certainty that this group really is oppressed. No matter the oppositions ignorance, our hypothetical groups violence really is in self defence.. This works unless you are thinking about something else?

Hi again wolly! Hmmm, where did I say what was ridiculous? I don't remember saying that. You might have to clarify.

My main point was that we seem to have arrived at a definition of self-defense which, though maybe consistent, is now so broad as to no longer constitute an exception to the use of violence. It seems implausible to claim that "violence is always immoral" if we admit that 1) Self-defense is violence; 2) Self-defense is not immoral; 3) Self-defense is resorted to all the time - perhaps as 'structurally' as the world itself is structurally unequal, i.e. violently repressive of equality.

Which is why I was suggesting in my last paragraph (maybe have a look again) that a possible way out would be to define a kind of threshold of oppression. Maybe we could find a way of defining what form of oppression would be "strong enough" to justify self defense as legitimate violence, and what would be not strong enough. But if we find no way of limiting the applicability of self-defense as a form of legit violence, then the argument will have to be updated.

Another way of putting my point would be to say that "Violence is always immoral, except in cases of self-defense against the oppression of ideas which happens every day in a structurally unequal world" is not ridiculous in itself, but becomes silly if taken as equivalent to "Violence is always immoral".

 

[wolly.green]

My main point was that we seem to have arrived at a definition of self-defense which, though maybe consistent, is now so broad as to no longer constitute an exception to the use of violence.

I'm having difficulty understanding how you arrive at this conclusion. I understand what you're saying, but not why this must be so. You said "Violence is always immoral, except in cases of self-defense against the oppression of ideas which happens every day in a structurally unequal world". Is this the reason that self defence cannot be an exception? If so, how does it follow?

 

[charlatan]

I suppose I should ask you this, wolly: do you think of there being an objective morality that can be arrived at by reason? I know we've probably talked this over elsewhere somewhat, but I think it's one of the prime points of relevance here.

I don't really find myself a believer in legitimate disagreement, and I think all conflicts of ideas can be reasoned through. However, there are those who don't/think of some disagreements as those of subjective codes of ethics, and I think they're the main opponents to answer.

Basically, if some disagreements can't be resolved by reason even in principle, then violence is necessary.

 

[wolly.green]

Basically, if some disagreements can't be resolved by reason even in principle, then violence is necessary.

If this is ever the case at all, sure? But can you think of an example?

 

[Ren]

If this is ever the case at all, sure? But can you think of an example?

An idea just came to mind. Suppose you go up to the roof of your apartment building one evening and you see your neighbour about to jump off. You try to convince him not to do it, but he won’t listen to you, he says he wants his life to end. You know him, you know he’s depressive and prone to great anxiety. You dash to him, grab him forcefully and violently pull him away from the edge. You might have to knock him violently on the head and make him unconscious. He’s taken care of at the hospital, and a few weeks later he tells you you saved his life and that he’s incredibly grateful, that he’s already feeling better and was being completely beside himself that night from anxiety.

This seems to be an example of legitimate use of violence that is not self-defense. If anything, the suicidal man was using self-defense against you! And yet this seems like a good action. Thoughts?

I'm having difficulty understanding how you arrive at this conclusion. I understand what you're saying, but not why this must be so. You said "Violence is always immoral, except in cases of self-defense against the oppression of ideas which happens every day in a structurally unequal world". Is this the reason that self defense cannot be an exception? If so, how does it follow?

Ok, I’ll try to explain this differently. To me, the statement:

Violence is always immoral, except in cases of self-defense

is equivalent to saying: “Non self-defense motivated violence is always immoral”. We can move from this to “violence is always immoral” if we can show that self-defense is never warranted, or exceptional, that is, not really part of the structural definition of violence. The first realisation that comes to mind is that, if the Utopia discussed in another thread was possible, then in that world violence would always be immoral (following from the statement in italics above) because that world, by definition, would be structurally non-violent, and so self-defense would never be called for. Or it would be exceptional: the violence that takes place in that world would arise from contingent factors rather than from the structure of the world itself.

But if our world is a “structurally unequal world”, peopled with self-interested humans who will always be falling prey to deceit, conceit, and the desire for power; if because of this, the most powerful humans will tend to belong precisely to that category, because their cunning and thirst for power will have propelled them where they are; then arguably our world is structurally oppressive, from the very nature of humanity. It is structured in such a way that oppression, in one way or another, will always be endemic to it. But if the world is structurally oppressive, then self-defense against oppression is also a structurally defined form of violence. But then, if (in our world) self-defense is structurally defined, can we still claim that it is exceptional? Aren’t ‘structural’ and ‘exceptional’ mutually exclusive?

 

[charlatan]

Wolly -- I mean, if people don't accept objective morals as a part of being rational, the examples abound!! Any case where someone acts in self-interest while harming another to get a desire fulfilled.

I don't know of any examples I'd accept, as I do tend to objective morals. But how does one ground them in reason? I have my attempts but it's nontrivial to me/I really would love to know your own attempts!

I don't think IF immorality is irrational that one could act in self interest while being immoral, as rejecting rationality in any circumstance leads to revoking the very framework to justify one's interests.

 

[charlatan]

I'd say it's quite easy to argue that it's incoherent to "act in one's interests" while abandoning reason. But really the claim I'm asking about is does a completely rational attitude imply all conflicts can be resolved.
Which is very related to whether morality is something above and beyond rationality that one either follows or doesn't, or part of rationality.

 

[wolly.green]

An idea just came to mind. Suppose you go up to the roof of your apartment building one evening and you see your neighbour about to jump off. You try to convince him not to do it, but he won’t listen to you, he says he wants his life to end. You know him, you know he’s depressive and prone to great anxiety. You dash to him, grab him forcefully and violently pull him away from the edge. You might have to knock him violently on the head and make him unconscious. He’s taken care of at the hospital, and a few weeks later he tells you you saved his life and that he’s incredibly grateful, that he’s already feeling better and was being completely beside himself that night from anxiety.

This seems to be an example of legitimate use of violence that is not self-defense. If anything, the suicidal man was using self-defense against you! And yet this seems like a good action. Thoughts?

The right question to ask here is: do individuals have an inalienable right to their own life? But in particular, do individuals have an inalienable right to take their own life? I think the answer is yes. Therefore it follows that your use of violence here is immoral. This seems like a terrible conclusion. But before you judge, I think it will be helpful for me to be a little more discriminating in my argument.

Usually if one is wanting to commit suicide, it is because he is depressed. There are lots of other reasons one might want to die, but let's just focus on depression for the moment. With depression, people feel a sense of hopelessness. They feel like their life is never going to get better. Therefore, the only way to escape pain is to commit suicide. We know that -- except for rare exceptions -- it is simply not true that life will never getting better. Therefore, if our friend wants to commit suicide, we know he is wrong. Not morally wrong though, but factually wrong. He is factually wrong that life will never get better.

But why should this matter? Well, we know the truth here, but not our friend. We know life will get better, but he does not. Which means by using violence to prevent suicide, we are essentially protecting him from himself. But are we really morally allowed to protect our friend from himself by using violence? This is a hard sell, a really hard sell. Are we really allow control of his life like this? You might have an argument, but personally I do not see one.

But if our world is a “structurally unequal world”, peopled with self-interested humans who will always be falling prey to deceit, conceit, and the desire for power; if because of this, the most powerful humans will tend to belong precisely to that category, because their cunning and thirst for power will have propelled them where they are; then arguably our world is structurally oppressive, from the very nature of humanity. It is structured in such a way that oppression, in one way or another, will always be endemic to it. But if the world is structurally oppressive, then self-defense against oppression is also a structurally defined form of violence. But then, if (in our world) self-defense is structurally defined, can we still claim that it is exceptional? Aren’t ‘structural’ and ‘exceptional’ mutually exclusive?

I think I understand. What you are saying is that oppression is unavoidable. Where there is society, there is oppression. This means that "self defence" is really common. There is nothing "exceptional" about it. But that is not what I mean when I say "exception". By exception, I do not mean uncommon. I simply mean that self defence is the only acceptable form of violence. It does not matter how common it actually is.

There is another way to interpret what you said. When you say "oppression is everywhere", you could mean that ALL violence involves self defence. But this is an absurd conclusion. Suppose I kill you because I think you're ugly. There is certainly violence here, but self defence? This is a bit of a stretch!

 

[wolly.green]

I don't know of any examples I'd accept, as I do tend to objective morals. But how does one ground them in reason? I have my attempts but it's nontrivial to me/I really would love to know your own attempts!

This is easy. What happens if morals are objective? Suppose I discover a true moral, what then? Well if it is objectively true, it is true regardless of anyone else's opinions. Thus if morals are objective, then they must be about reality itself. They must be claims about reality as it really is, independent of subjective opinion. From here, it's easy to see how one discovers morals rationally; through creative conjecture and criticism!

 

[charlatan]

What happens if morals are objective?

Certainly if so, we discover them via reason like you say; however, I was looking for why you do think there do in fact exist objective ones.

 

[wolly.green]

Certainly if so, we discover them via reason like you say; however, I was looking for why you do think there do in fact exist objective ones.

It's quite simple. Morals are prescriptions on how one aught to act. Suppose one wants to know how they aught to act in a particular situation, what can they do? Find an explanation! One could try to find an answer to the problem "what should I do?". This is interesting because if finding morals amounts to solving problems, then we can change the question "how do we know morals are objective?" to "how do we know all problems have answers?". In other words, the answer to the question "are morals objective" is the same as the answer to the question "is truth objective"? The reason is that true explanations are always answers to some question. When one tries to find true explanations, they are trying to find an answer to some question. Therefore, if morals are answers to questions, asking whether they are objective is the same as asking whether truth is objective. This is just an extension of Poppers epistemology.

 

[Ren]

@wolly.green I don't think you are answering @charlatan's question, though I'll let him explain why.

The question about the objective nature of morality is, in my opinion, vastly more complex than you seem to believe! If that's helpful, have a look at this entry on metaethics when you have time. I think it will shed light on what charlatan and myself have been asking you.

 

[wolly.green]

@wolly.green I don't think you are answering @charlatan's question, though I'll let him explain why.

The question about the objective nature of morality is, in my opinion, vastly more complex than you seem to believe! If that's helpful, have a look at this entry on metaethics when you have time. I think it will shed light on what charlatan and myself have been asking you.

Could you please summarise for me? Every time I read a Stanford Philosophy entry, I need to write a whole essay before posting a response. I don't do this with Popper because I already understand him.

 

[Ren]

Could you please summarise for me? Every time I read a Stanford Philosophy entry, I need to write a whole essay before posting a response. I don't do this with Popper because I already understand him.

I will attempt summarising it with pleasure, but it might take me a bit of time. (I'm also messaging from the workplace, scandalously). Oh and I also need to answer dogman's latest post on the Utopia thread. So much philosophical homework to do...

Spoiler: BUT

I think I understand. What you are saying is that oppression is unavoidable. Where there is society, there is oppression. This means that "self defence" is really common. There is nothing "exceptional" about it. But that is not what I mean when I say "exception". By exception, I do not mean uncommon. I simply mean that self defence is the only acceptable form of violence. It does not matter how common it actually is.

Yes, you understood well. I think I am satisfied with where our exchange has brought us - not to agree, but to demarcate where we don't quite agree. I understand where you're coming from in your answer to the suicide example, but I do not quite agree that it is immoral to save somebody from himself by using violence. I think that once I've talked a little bit about metaethics and the valuation of morality, I'll be better able to explain why. In the mean time - have a nice day guys!

 

[charlatan]

Suppose one wants to know how they aught to act in a particular situation, what can they do? Find an explanation

Now here's the really (to me at least) juicy part: even if someone is a scientific realist, a moral pragmatist/anti-realist might well say the following: how I ought to act in a particular situation more or less follows from the goals I set, but those goals are, until otherwise demonstrated, at my discretion; the situation underdetermines my goals.
To be a moral realist at least traditionally requires that at least some goals are forced on me by reason alone, given the situation.

I like this because it ties in to what we were discussing on the other thread about falsification -- it appears that a non-pragmatist realist has quite a different reaction to situations of underdetermination by data, as compared to the typical pragmatist non-realist, the latter in effect viewing underdetermination as a good excuse to say "we essentially make up the theory so it does what we want it to do."
Only, it seems this reaction is more frequently applied to deny moral realism than to deny scientific realism. Possibly because of the possibility of falsification not being seriously denied by most scientifically minded folk.