Science and Truth

[charlatan]

As a tangential note, I think it helps somewhat to separate theories of action from theories of moral statement, because I find it much easier to say what is and isn't moral a state of affairs in what can reasonably be said to be objective a way than I do to find a way to compel everyone to act morally.
And here I don't even mean compel in terms of force, but compel in terms of reason.
I'd love if there were a way, but I'm not sure there is.

I tend to believe that compassion is an essential ingredient of what motivates action to be moral, even if much of what is and isn't moral might be explained in somewhat colder/detached terms. The motivator itself doesn't seem to be cold. And absent that motivator, I'm not sure what I could do.

(Interestingly, it seeeeems like even Kant, who was all for morality based on reason alone, allowed some place for compassionate motivation, e.g. not distancing oneself from the suffering of animals so as to motivate one to act morally...not an expert, so I'm not sure if this is the right interp, but it's my sense at least.....)

These are just general musings since we both seem interested in the subject.

 

[wolly.green]

@wolly.green -- well I'd use the "we may as well" statement for physics, too. I think one can be as skeptical as one wants, a-la Hume or whoever else, but basically this is where I distinguish illogical from unreasonable: "we may as well" means it would be unreasonable, even if not directly logically contradictory, to think otherwise. Meaning, in some cases the set of premises one is led to naturally seems to be the same for everyone.

I think even physics, while certainly independent of individual human subject (and objective in that sense) may not be the most natural description of reality to, say, another being. Maybe, for instance, quantum physics would be less bewildering to another creature because they've not evolved to work with impressions that essentially correspond to the macroscopic, not quantum, scale.

I think of morals as divided into two camps: one is just basic morality, concerned with human suffering, and the other is the general theory of value judgment. I see no reason why every question of value-comparison should have an objective answer, because I think the premises by which one might judge that question may depend on different goals. Given a particular goal, it's more likely there's an objective answer. I think what makes physics have such natural premises that we by and large can converge on is simply that there's a very canonical map from our experiences to a rigid logical structure: that is, because physical quantities have a pretty direct map to mathematical abstractions.

I think basic morality strikes me as much more likely to have a canonical set of premises to use in deciding (and so our "might as well" is my slippery language for objective )

No offense, but I am having great difficulty understanding your writing. I don't mean to be a dick, but have you ever consider picking up a writing manual? They can teach you how to write to an audience that may know nothing about what you want to talk about.

I see no reason why every question of value-comparison should have an objective answer, because I think the premises by which one might judge that question may depend on different goals. Given a particular goal, it's more likely there's an objective answer.

Well surely value comparison can be made objective by comparing end goals. By comparing the goals one is interested in achieving?

 

[wolly.green]

As a tangential note, I think it helps somewhat to separate theories of action from theories of moral statement, because I find it much easier to say what is and isn't moral a state of affairs in what can reasonably be said to be objective a way than I do to find a way to compel everyone to act morally.
And here I don't even mean compel in terms of force, but compel in terms of reason.
I'd love if there were a way, but I'm not sure there is.

I tend to believe that compassion is an essential ingredient of what motivates action to be moral, even if much of what is and isn't moral might be explained in somewhat colder/detached terms. The motivator itself doesn't seem to be cold. And absent that motivator, I'm not sure what I could do.

(Interestingly, it seeeeems like even Kant, who was all for morality based on reason alone, allowed some place for compassionate motivation, e.g. not distancing oneself from the suffering of animals so as to motivate one to act morally...not an expert, so I'm not sure if this is the right interp, but it's my sense at least.....)

These are just general musings since we both seem interested in the subject.

Im sorry, I really don't understand what you're talking about. Are you speaking as an instrumentalist, an empiricist, a logical positivist? Perhaps you are taking an Wittgensteinean spin on morality; using ideas from his book Philosophical Investigations?

 

[charlatan]

Well, I'd say we can certainly endeavor to compare goals and try to create one single goal that is most rational -- not sure if there's any reason to say there always is a goal that will subsume all others, though. In such a case, the value of something would remain goal-relative.

As for empiricism/logical positivism: I'm a little confused, because I usually think of logical positivism in connection to how we understand physics. Not sure what it has to say on morality.

My point in that section was that what motivates us to act morally is quite a separate issue from what is and isn't a moral state of affairs -- that is, I may be able to condemn an action as immoral but not be as sure about whether I can call the action a consequence of a failure to reason.

 

[charlatan]

I'm sorry if what I say is hard to follow -- usually it's easiest if someone asks for clarification, given that really makes my audience clear to me (especially hard to tell on an anonymous forum); probably part of the issue is that I'm not really sure which philosopher's take this falls into. I've read around and mostly this is my compiled reaction to a lot of the thoughts I've seen on the issue.
They're not yet something I'm fully confident of, but I'm starting to grow more secure in them.

At the heart of my point is that I *don't* think all moral questions have to involve a shaky kind of relativism -- just that by restricting the scope of what we ask for, it seems to me we can achieve objectivity.
I'm not sure it is even relevant to what we generally mean by moral judgment to be able to decide an arbitrary value problem.
E.g. why should I have to be able to decide between the value of a sports car and another car to condemn genocide as immoral?

 

[wolly.green]

Well, I'd say we can certainly endeavor to compare goals and try to create one single goal that is most rational -- not sure if there's any reason to say there always is a goal that will subsume all others, though. In such a case, the value of something would remain goal-relative.

As for empiricism/logical positivism: I'm a little confused, because I usually think of logical positivism in connection to how we understand physics. Not sure what it has to say on morality.

My point in that section was that what motivates us to act morally is quite a separate issue from what is and isn't a moral state of affairs -- that is, I may be able to condemn an action as immoral but not be as sure about whether I can call the action a consequence of a failure to reason.

Well, I'd say we can certainly endeavor to compare goals and try to create one single goal that is most rational -- not sure if there's any reason to say there always is a goal that will subsume all others, though. In such a case, the value of something would remain goal-relative.

I actually disagree with your characterization of morality. I don't see why morality has to be instrumental. To me, morals are our best explanations about why one aught to act in a particular way and in a particular manor. Morals always have an associated explanation. In this sense, there is moral progress when one finds better explanations. This can be compared to progress in science, when one theory replaces another.

 

[charlatan]

I actually think I'm precisely not characterizing morality as based on the individual interests; I'm much more sympathetic to views of morality that talk about suffering at large. I am saying that I've as yet not found a way to compel someone to act morally based on reason (and would love to hear ideas).

So basically if there's something instrumentalist-seeming about my ideas, it's my ideas on how someone might justify an action--I'd still not call that action, if it violated obvious moral statements about harm/suffering, a moral action. I would simply say that, while I could offer reasons to act morally, I can't find a way -- and again, I'd love to hear ideas -- to basically say someone would be irrational not to make the most moral choice. I certainly don't think someone would be more rational to act immorally and in self-interest or whatever than if someone, say, acted morally based on a traditional "what if everyone acted as I did -- the world as I know it would be in a much worse state of affairs, even by my own self-interested definition of 'worse'"

I don't think one has to use the terminology "moral" in this way more detached from duty-to-act-a-certain-way characterizations. I'd certainly say you could use it the way you are. But hopefully I can make clear why I think one might use the terminology my way, even if it isn't yet clear. It's because I simply think it is more obvious what isn't a moral state of affairs than it is obvious to say how people should and shouldn't act.

 

[wolly.green]

I actually think I'm precisely not characterizing morality as based on the individual interests; I'm much more sympathetic to views of morality that talk about suffering at large. I am saying that I've as yet not found a way to compel someone to act morally based on reason (and would love to hear ideas).

So basically if there's something instrumentalist-seeming about my ideas, it's my ideas on how someone might justify an action--I'd still not call that action, if it violated obvious moral statements about harm/suffering, a moral action. I would simply say that, while I could offer reasons to act morally, I can't find a way -- and again, I'd love to hear ideas -- to basically say someone would be irrational not to make the most moral choice. I certainly don't think someone would be more rational to act immorally and in self-interest or whatever than if someone, say, acted morally based on a traditional "what if everyone acted as I did -- the world as I know it would be in a much worse state of affairs, even by my own self-interested definition of 'worse'"

I don't think one has to use the terminology "moral" in this way more detached from duty-to-act-a-certain-way characterizations. I'd certainly say you could use it the way you are. But hopefully I can make clear why I think one might use the terminology my way, even if it isn't yet clear. It's because I simply think it is more obvious what isn't a moral state of affairs than it is obvious to say how people should and shouldn't act.

Ok I see.

What about basing your morality on epistemology. Actually, what are your views on epistemology? Do you think it is possible for humans to obtain absolute, perfect knowledge? That is, knowledge without error? I think this question is epistemological significant because the answer tells us whether progress can happen indefinitely or not.

 

[charlatan]

There are probably a few ways to answer if we can obtain perfect knowledge:

- complete knowledge?

- true knowledge, not just knowledge that is "useful"/serves a purpose

I think the former is harder to say--maybe we are limited by our mental faculties, maybe not. When it comes to the latter, I'm not much of an instrumentalist, in that I think when the premises are canonical with which we can answer a given question, there's no reason to stop at "this way of looking at things is useful" and we might as well go the next step and say "this is true about X subject."
I distinguished between, say, physics and economics here, because it seems to me one can evaluate economics models more from the vantage point of "usefulness" than works for physics.

Probably the ultimate point here is tied into my distinction between theories of how to act vs theories of morality: the latter simply are statements about states of affairs, whereas the latter seem to me to invoke a subject who is actually deciding how to act. I could imagine saying the former to be more tied to questions of usefulness.

I suppose one could try to make even physics just a "useful" theory for making predictions, and say our own limited consciousness can only hope to understand physics in ways that are helpful to us -- that we're not really making statements of truth. I don't find that too convincing, because at that point we're basically in a position where it's not even clear what physics would be if not based on the premises we're forced to adopt. I might say there is more knowledge out there than physics, but not say it itself is relative/just a useful pov.

A good thought experiment: what if there were a superintelligent AI some day? Would I let it decide its own course of "morality"? Probably not -- if it killed innocent children, I'd still say that's not a moral state of affairs.

So basically for me, it all amounts to whether there is a canonical set of premises that defines the pursuit of a certain subset of knowledge, or if the set is fuzzy

 

[wolly.green]

There are probably a few ways to answer if we can obtain perfect knowledge:

- complete knowledge?

- true knowledge, not just knowledge that is "useful"/serves a purpose

I think the former is harder to say--maybe we are limited by our mental faculties, maybe not. When it comes to the latter, I'm not much of an instrumentalist, in that I think when the premises are canonical with which we can answer a given question, there's no reason to stop at "this way of looking at things is useful" and we might as well go the next step and say "this is true about X subject."
I distinguished between, say, physics and economics here, because it seems to me one can evaluate economics models more from the vantage point of "usefulness" than works for physics.

Probably the ultimate point here is tied into my distinction between theories of how to act vs theories of morality: the latter simply are statements about states of affairs, whereas the latter seem to me to invoke a subject who is actually deciding how to act. I could imagine saying the former to be more tied to questions of usefulness.

I suppose one could try to make even physics just a "useful" theory for making predictions, and say our own limited consciousness can only hope to understand physics in ways that are helpful to us -- that we're not really making statements of truth. I don't find that too convincing, because at that point we're basically in a position where it's not even clear what physics would be if not based on the premises we're forced to adopt. I might say there is more knowledge out there than physics, but not say it itself is relative/just a useful pov.

A good thought experiment: what if there were a superintelligent AI some day? Would I let it decide its own course of "morality"? Probably not -- if it killed innocent children, I'd still say that's not a moral state of affairs.

So basically for me, it all amounts to whether there is a canonical set of premises that defines the pursuit of a certain subset of knowledge, or if the set is fuzzy

Wow, I totally disagree with almost everything you said. Particularly your characterization of morality, truth and theories. But no matter!

 

[charlatan]

@wolly.green -- maybe expand on what your views are on the questions you asked me? I'm not convinced we disagree till we discuss it out, like eg I'm still very unclear on what your earlier disagreement with my description of morality was -- the reaction you offered, in particular, just did not ring of something I'd disagree with.

I don't have terribly rigid views on these topics. I'd call my answers perspectives at best, not strong views -- it's possible I'd find what you have to say pretty agreeable!
I think I have strong reactions against some views, but I wouldn't say I have a particularly pronounced opinion on what the answers are to some of your questions.

 

[charlatan]

Where we certainly agree afaik is I'm also against what you seem to be here

I'm sure you are familiar with the say "truth is relative, who am I to judge?" I am interested to see if you agree that this attitude is harmful

Like I certainly don't think people can reasonably adopt whatever premises they like, or live by contradictions. So, the question is -- how does your approach to refuting these views differ from mine?

 

[wolly.green]

@wolly.green -- maybe expand on what your views are on the questions you asked me? I'm not convinced we disagree till we discuss it out, like eg I'm still very unclear on what your earlier disagreement with my description of morality was -- the reaction you offered, in particular, just did not ring of something I'd disagree with.

I don't have terribly rigid views on these topics. I'd call my answers perspectives at best, not strong views -- it's possible I'd find what you have to say pretty agreeable!
I think I have strong reactions against some views, but I wouldn't say I have a particularly pronounced opinion on what the answers are to some of your questions.

Ok ill give it my best shot tomorrow. Its almost bed time for me. Night!

 

[charlatan]

G'night!! I look forward. To be honest, I might learn something -- I'd really hate to give the impression that I've got rigid views on this subject. I do think there are some subjects where I've got pretty solid views, but I'm not so sure of the ones we've been discussing that I'm all that settled

 

[cptawesome]

Of all non spiritual individuals here, is there really anyone that believes science has a monopoly on truth? Better still, are there still people that believe in relativism. Not as opposed to the idea of absolute truth, but rather as opposed to the idea that two contradictory claims can not be true simultaneously. That is, it is possible for two contradictory claims to be true simultaneously.

Its always been a constant battle between filling in the blank space with theories and filling the blank space with facts and science. Maybe its ignorance to accept truth in our ability to deny it. Maybe its our ability to deny truth that wants to accept it. Faith is a battle

 

[wolly.green]

G'night!! I look forward. To be honest, I might learn something -- I'd really hate to give the impression that I've got rigid views on this subject. I do think there are some subjects where I've got pretty solid views, but I'm not so sure of the ones we've been; discussing that I'm all that settled

I want to try to avoid using esoteric jargon as much as possible. That way, there will be no misunderstanding.

Karl Popper wrenched our understanding of science and its goals away from its empiricist roots and towards an appreciation of the fact that humans are fallible. He showed that because we are fallible, we can never be sure of the absolute truth of our best explanations. The best a scientist can ever do is admire his theories, to reveal its beauty to the world and then attempt to crush it under the most severe falsification he can muster. If after the struggle his theory survives unharmed, we can say it has been corroborated. But we can never say it has been verified or proved. Although Popper intended falsificationism to apply to science, I believe it can be applied, more generally, to all forms of knowledge. That is that all human knowledge is flawed; there is always some error and conception. But if this is true, then perhaps progress is better characterized as an attempt at solving these problems. That is, to correct for the flaws in human knowledge.

So what does this have to do with morality? If all human knowledge, including moral knowledge, is prone to error and misconception, then perhaps the most evil thing one can do is to prevent another from identifying that error. Because by doing this, you prevent another from solving problems. And since one must solve problems to survive, if one is prevented from doing so, he will fail and die. This is the connection I see between epistemology and morality.

 

[charlatan]

OK, @wolly.green, so I'm somewhat familiar with Deutsch/he's a Popper fan, and I'm getting the sense the gist here is a view that an objective truth really exists (vs simply viewing there being no real knowledge, only goals to meet/problems to solve) BUT that our knowledge of it tends to be flawed.

Here's a point of significance to me: where do we draw a distinction between flawed and incomplete knowledge? Let us, for instance, ask: what if I have good empirical knowledge (I've done the experiments and the math works consistently), but my interpretation needs refining? Some would call that flawed knowledge ( maybe especially if one views knowledge in terms of "good explanations"). Others might choose to regard it as merely incomplete: the facts are right, but with more facts, there may be a different interpretation to suggest itself.

My reaction to the Popper view is I suspect I'd sympathize a fair bit with it...not sure if I'd look at it exactly the same way or not. Unfortunately, Popper is on my reading list, not someone I know that well. I might've sounded more optimistic about humans achieving truth, but I suspect I'd see it as incomplete in a way reminiscent of the 'flawed' view.

 

[wolly.green]

OK, @wolly.green, so I'm somewhat familiar with Deutsch/he's a Popper fan, and I'm getting the sense the gist here is a view that an objective truth really exists (vs simply viewing there being no real knowledge, only goals to meet/problems to solve) BUT that our knowledge of it tends to be flawed.

Here's a point of significance to me: where do we draw a distinction between flawed and incomplete knowledge? Let us, for instance, ask: what if I have good empirical knowledge (I've done the experiments and the math works consistently), but my interpretation needs refining? Some would call that flawed knowledge ( maybe especially if one views knowledge in terms of "good explanations"). Others might choose to regard it as merely incomplete: the facts are right, but with more facts, there may be a different interpretation to suggest itself.

My reaction to the Popper view is I suspect I'd sympathize a fair bit with it...not sure if I'd look at it exactly the same way or not. Unfortunately, Popper is on my reading list, not someone I know that well.

Well according to Popper, it doesn't really matter. Incomplete knowledge is still flawed knowledge. Even when you somehow "complete" the explanation, it is still flawed. I don't see how the distinction makes any difference to the epistemology under question here.

Also, have you rad The Beginning of Infinity?

 

[charlatan]

@wolly.green OK I guessed he'd say incomplete is still flawed. Then, I suspect I'd be on board with him.

I've read parts of Beginning of Infinity

 

[wolly.green]

@wolly.green OK I guessed he'd say incomplete is still flawed. Then, I suspect I'd be on board with him.

I've read parts of Beginning of Infinity

You should read the whole thing. The chapter on cultural evolution is the single most exciting chapter I have ever read, in any book ever. There is so much gold in that book. Eugh, so exciting.