What Kind of Metaphysician Are You?

[charlatan]

But it seems to me, in any case, that the label neutral monism (especially monism) is indeed somewhat misleading here, given that you are willing to make room for property dualism at the very least.

Rewriting this again slightly: I think this once again comes down to the fact that monism could refer to monism about fundamental properties, not all properties. After all, the goal of ontology could easily be seen to find the fundamental properties, as they explain all others by definition. I've been very clear that I mean the fundamental kind, by repeatedly specifying that I formulate physicalism as the thesis that all properties follow from the physical ones for free.


On mathematical properties, I'm sort of unsure if the word emergent is just getting in the way, so let's say what's being claimed is they're higher level. That is, physical objects have a mathematical structure, but other things could have the same mathematical structure. So the mathematical structure is less specific than the full physical properties, which imply the mathematical structure (all this is saying is that it's more specific to say in E=MC^2 that E refers to energy and M to mass than to merely talk of a mathematical equation of that form).

The significance of this, to reiterate, is that experiences could also be less specific -- maybe, as you said, there could be angels or unembodied experiences. This would suggest that, if physicalism is true of our experiences, then the experiences themselves could perhaps have been those of, say, those unembodied minds. Just as something else could have the mathematical structure of the particles of my body-brain, something else maybe could have the same experiences, so my experiences underspecify the facts about my body/brain.


Parsimony -- I don't think we get to choose if all the properties happen to be of one type! If all can be explained by the existence of one type, that's already pretty good, I think, and even that, we can't necessarily ask of the universe.
However, I actually think it's quite questionable if a view with nonphysical properties is at all less parsimonious if e.g. we accept that they may be nonphysical in virtue of this nonspecificity thing. That is, if we've instantiated something that necessarily has a certain mathematical structure, we've accounted entirely for the existence of the mathematical structure. In this sense, the M properties are implied by the P properties, yet the M properties aren't identical to the P ones because they're not specific enough -- just any old thing that is essentially described by the same mathematics as our laws of physics simply isn't necessarily physical!


Leap of faith -- here I confess to not knowing what you mean, and I'm very skeptical this is a problem with the view. Any view on consciousness is a guess at this point, so that's a nonstarter. If what you mean is we have no idea what the hell NEUTRAL crap is, that's fine, but it's again no argument against the view, as it seems one could uncover that neutral properties are fundamental on logical grounds without being able to specify much about what specific laws hold of them. That is, one may conclude it is logically impossible, based on all the metaphysical arguments available, to bridge the metaphysical gap between the public and the private by reducing one to the other, and also conclude against dualism varieties on the usual views about the causal impotence of the mental, or some more sophisticated version of that point, and thus conclude in favor of a neutral view on totally rational grounds with no commitment to how much further can be known about them. This does *not* mean the conclusion that the fundamental properties are neutral is a leap in and of itself! It also doesn't mean I see a straightforward conclusion to the neutral at this time.

Maybe we won't develop knowledge of these properties as well as we have developed scientific knowledge, but again, is that a complaint against the plausibility of the view or merely a wish we aren't doomed to failure? I think it can only be the latter! However, even that complaint doesn't follow, as who says we can't uncover these neutral properties with the same success of science? That might require some argument about cognitive limitation, etc.



Maybe the question I want to ask is --- do you actually see any better alternatives? I don't, personally -- I bet I could attack virtually any alternative at least as well as someone could attack this one.

My attitude is simply that we don't know which one is true, but among the crapshoots I doubt there are much stronger guesses. I do think there are several good guesses, not just one.

 

[Percival]

Fascinating stuff, thanks for sharing! Any chance you could detail for us a bit more what led you from Plotinian panpsychism-like ontology to Buddhist Abhidharma teaching? Getting to know more about the linkages between the two would be super interesting. My knowledge of Eastern philosophy is still quite scant, but I plan on exploring more of it in the future.

Good question. The links are unlikely to be historical, although it's not inconceivable. The connection for me is methodological. Both are "applied philosophy", not thinking for thinking's sake. This is obvious for buddhism, but there are numerous passages in the Enneads that refer to ethical practice as a prelude to meditative withdrawal, first from the senses, then emotional attachments, then discursive thinking. The main differences, other than historical origins, is that Plotinus attempts a cataphatic description of his interior experiences, whereas Buddhism (especially Theravada and Zen) takes an apophatic approach, focusing on method almost exclusively, "open mouth, already wrong."

 

[Ren]

Rewriting this again slightly: I think this once again comes down to the fact that monism could refer to monism about fundamental properties, not all properties. After all, the goal of ontology could easily be seen to find the fundamental properties, as they explain all others by definition. I've been very clear that I mean the fundamental kind, by repeatedly specifying that I formulate physicalism as the thesis that all properties follow from the physical ones for free.

On mathematical properties, I'm sort of unsure if the word emergent is just getting in the way, so let's say what's being claimed is they're higher level. That is, physical objects have a mathematical structure, but other things could have the same mathematical structure. So the mathematical structure is less specific than the full physical properties, which imply the mathematical structure (all this is saying is that it's more specific to say in E=MC^2 that E refers to energy and M to mass than to merely talk of a mathematical equation of that form).

The significance of this, to reiterate, is that experiences could also be less specific -- maybe, as you said, there could be angels or unembodied experiences. This would suggest that, if physicalism is true of our experiences, then the experiences themselves could perhaps have been those of, say, those unembodied minds. Just as something else could have the mathematical structure of the particles of my body-brain, something else maybe could have the same experiences, so my experiences underspecify the facts about my body/brain.

Gotcha, charlie.

I find this idea of positing physicalist monism with mathematical structure + experiential content as higher-order from the physical properties quite interesting. You're right that technically speaking, this is a form of nonreductive physical monism, with higher-order properties. Would you then say that qualia and mathematical structure are higher order in the same way? The thing is, I've difficulty considering them under the same ontological light, hierarchy-wise. On the one hand, it seems clear that qualia must be experienced by something. Although disembodied minds and angels lack physical properties, they still are something -- e.g. bundles of properties of some other kind. And it is those unified bundles that 'have' the qualia. I'm not sure those bundles 'have' mathematical structure in the same way. Although qualia must be experienced by something, it's less obvious to me that mathematical properties must be 'had' by something. Don't they exist purely abstractly, whereas qualia don't?

Sure, E=MC^2 can be specified further by referring E to energy and M to mass; but how do you specify further the following: 1+1=2 ? It seems to me that by using the example of E=MC^2, you are possibly begging the question by already taking a formula from physics, with clear physical nomenclature, rather than a purely mathematical abstraction. E=MC^2 only holds in a world in which there are such things as energy and mass; but what about 1+1=2, does it not hold in all possible worlds necessarily?

Maybe the question I want to ask is --- do you actually see any better alternatives? I don't, personally -- I bet I could attack virtually any alternative at least as well as someone could attack this one.

Nope, I don't either Remember, I'm a continental philosopher, I only discuss these topics with you because it's fun, but it's nowhere near my area of expertise. I just try to poke at your arguments to keep the conversation going. ^^

 

[charlatan]

Would you then say that qualia and mathematical structure are higher order in the same way?

Not in the same way -- the analogy goes only as far as saying they seem to be pretty serious candidates for nonphysical properties of the physical! Qualia and mathematical structure seem to me also to be very different.

Sure, E=MC^2 can be specified further by referring E to energy and M to mass; but how do you specify further the following: 1+1=2 ? It seems to me that by using the example of E=MC^2, you are possibly begging the question by already taking a formula from physics, with clear physical nomenclature, rather than a purely mathematical abstraction. E=MC^2 only holds in a world in which there are such things as energy and mass; but what about 1+1=2, does it not hold in all possible worlds necessarily?

So I see where you're confused, and it's really because that's not what I'm saying, and I think the confusion is arising from an annoying trick of terminology a lot of philosophers subscribe to, but easily dispelled.

You seem worried that I'm saying ALL mathematical properties somehow correspond to physical ones, e.g. 1+1=2 seems totally general. That's totally true -- there are zillions of mathematical equations that I doubt correspond to physics. It is absolutely not true that every mathematical truth can be 'extended' to a physical truth.

The key is physicalism is often just a thesis about the concrete properties, not abstract. Even WV Quine, one of the most science-only no-minds types, believed in abstract objects in addition to physics.

So what I'm saying is merely that all physical properties might reasonably be said to have a mathematical structural aspect that does not exhaust them (because we could think of E=MC^2 abstractly and not think of the terms as referring to the speed of light, energy, mass--- maybe in an alternate world they refer to qeed, qenergy and qass). Not that the mathematical properties of the world ALL correspond to physical properties.

In the same sense, maybe various physical states have mental properties that do not exhaust them, so the mental is not = to any of the physical, but it's nonetheless determined in a way that doesn't lead us to question physicalist intuitions. Surely the fact the physical has a mathematical structure is one of the most obvious/well subscribed to thing, yet strictly speaking, that is not a physical property.



Anyway, my attitude is the neutral thing is really not claiming to solve the mind-body problem in practice/detail so much as it's telling you what you rule out at a very very high level --- if you rule out that the straightforwardly physical and the straightforwardly mental can be reduced to one another, you're looking at something that's neither of them probably grounding both (and I'd refer to these varieties as neutral monist flavored -- whether they dissolve public-private or treat it as higher level) OR subscribing to dualism. I personally prefer not to go to dualism about fundamental properties because you end up with the same types of conundrums to some extent about how the mental interacts with the physical.

It seems to me either you opt for dualism or opt for some kind of idealism (qualia-only) or panpsychism (also kind of qualia-everywhere although panpsychism tends to be neutral monist in nature already.... it suggests the same thing has both the mathematical and conscious properties), OR one of these super-physicalists.

BTW I take super-physicalists seriously if they give arguments, vs just going "c'mon no airy fairy non-science" -- even the eliminativists. I think I'm mostly wary of them because a huge ton seem to be the latter.

 

[JamieUK92]

This is my type of thread!

I identify as a Unitarian but my core beliefs are probably a mashup of various religions/ideologies. I believe in a single source consciousness (for our universe anyway). If the multiverse is a thing then maybe there are many “sources”.

I think the universe is likely teeming with life of which branch from the same source energy and are just different expressions of this source. I do think we are extremely primitive in the grand scheme of things, especially in spiritual aspects. We are obviously moving fast technologically but what I’m trying to say is that I don’t think we are even capable of comprehending even the basics of existence. Apart from that we are here and we live and then die for whatever reason.

I believe that we all have “god” within us and if you look at how prevelant maths is in nature (golden ratio, pi etc) how can there not be some kind of underlying intelligence behind it all? For me it’s way too systematic to be by accident. However, if the multiverse is a multiverse of all possible configurations then I guess it could be an accident but then what intelligence lies behind the multiverse. My head hurts...

 

[Ren]

You seem worried that I'm saying ALL mathematical properties somehow correspond to physical ones, e.g. 1+1=2 seems totally general. That's totally true -- there are zillions of mathematical equations that I doubt correspond to physics. It is absolutely not true that every mathematical truth can be 'extended' to a physical truth.

The key is physicalism is often just a thesis about the concrete properties, not abstract. Even WV Quine, one of the most science-only no-minds types, believed in abstract objects in addition to physics.

So what I'm saying is merely that all physical properties might reasonably be said to have a mathematical structural aspect that does not exhaust them (because we could think of E=MC^2 abstractly and not think of the terms as referring to the speed of light, energy, mass--- maybe in an alternate world they refer to qeed, qenergy and qass). Not that the mathematical properties of the world ALL correspond to physical properties

Okay, this clears up everything for me as far as abstract objects are concerned. The reference to Quine was useful for context.

 

[Ren]

Good question. The links are unlikely to be historical, although it's not inconceivable. The connection for me is methodological. Both are "applied philosophy", not thinking for thinking's sake. This is obvious for buddhism, but there are numerous passages in the Enneads that refer to ethical practice as a prelude to meditative withdrawal, first from the senses, then emotional attachments, then discursive thinking. The main differences, other than historical origins, is that Plotinus attempts a cataphatic description of his interior experiences, whereas Buddhism (especially Theravada and Zen) takes an apophatic approach, focusing on method almost exclusively, "open mouth, already wrong."

That's highly interesting, thank you for sharing this insight. I agree that the Enneads contain much that could be considered practical philosophy.

 

[charlatan]

Okay, this clears up everything for me as far as abstract objects are concerned. The reference to Quine was useful for context.

Yep -- it's just a general thing, I am guessing the reason the isms are sometimes phrased more in terms of worry about what concrete objects exist is really that abstract objects either don't exist at all or exist in every possible world, so in some sense, they're not first priority to worry about. What concrete objects exist is the interesting question for many, probably because they presumably might not have existed, so their status is a unique feature of our world.

I try to give the mathematical example, because in my time worrying about this stuff, I did originally find it a bit tough to get used to the existence of nonphysical properties apparently being compatible with physicalism.

However, the more I think about it, almost every physicist and die-hard-Quine-type takes seriously that physical things have a mathematical structure, and rarely do people dispute that this structure doesn't exhaust the physical properties (i.e. the equations could've described something else, presumably).

 

[Ren]

We are obviously moving fast technologically but what I’m trying to say is that I don’t think we are even capable of comprehending even the basics of existence.

When you say that we aren't capable of comprehending the basics of existence, do you mean as of now, or rather that humans are constitutively incapable of it, i.e. that the grasping of existence is something prior to reflective consciousness that can never be realized by a limited embodied mind?

 

[JamieUK92]

Well I meant “as of now” but I also believe that the core properties of existence are intangible to our limited mind.

However, I believe once humans start to evolve spiritually, these “more of” these properties will slowly enter our sphere of tangible objects. This process could take thousands of years.

Imagine this:

You exist as a 2D conscious being living on a piece of paper in our current reality. How is it even possible for this 2D being to even interact with properties of 3D existence? Other than purely imaginative theories?

So, basically I believe we can interact with/gain an understanding the properties of 3D existence but that is probably one of possibly infinite layers of the onion that is existence.

I don’t know maybe I’m talking complete rubbish haha

 

[JamieUK92]

I want to clarify that when I say “3D properties” of existence what I actually mean is properties that are tangible to a physical being living in that dimensional plane of existence. By “core properties” I mean the properties that must be understood in order to properly understand the onion of existence as a whole object. I believe we are only capable of understanding everything from our tangible onion layer downwards. If that makes any sense!

 

[Ren]

Well I meant “as of now” but I also believe that the core properties of existence are intangible to our limited mind.

However, I believe once humans start to evolve spiritually, these “more of” these properties will slowly enter our sphere of tangible objects. This process could take thousands of years.

Imagine this:

You exist as a 2D conscious being living on a piece of paper in our current reality. How is it even possible for this 2D being to even interact with properties of 3D existence? Other than purely imaginative theories?

So, basically I believe we can interact with/gain an understanding the properties of 3D existence but that is probably one of possibly infinite layers of the onion that is existence.

I don’t know maybe I’m talking complete rubbish haha

I want to clarify that when I say “3D properties” of existence what I actually mean is properties that are tangible to a physical being living in that dimensional plane of existence. By “core properties” I mean the properties that must be understood in order to properly understand the onion of existence as a whole object. I believe we are only capable of understanding everything from our tangible onion layer downwards. If that makes any sense!

Don't ever be afraid of talking rubbish -- philosophy is all about questioning boldly and speculation

I agree with you that we can only get to understand existence deeper from our tangible onion layer downwards. You seem to believe that this understanding is tied to a form of spiritual evolution, rather than a scientific one. Do you have spiritual influences that have led you down this path?

 

[JamieUK92]

Don't ever be afraid of talking rubbish -- philosophy is all about questioning boldly and speculation

I agree with you that we can only get to understand existence deeper from our tangible onion layer downwards. You seem to believe that this understanding is tied to a form of spiritual evolution, rather than a scientific one. Do you have spiritual influences that have led you down this path?

Well, I don’t think there is a difference between spiritual and scientific progression. Science is simply the investigation into and the attempted explanation of how “something” in the natural world works. That “something” could be anything that exists. It’s just the spiritual realm isn’t seen as part of our “natural world” yet and thus is seen as distinct from science.

However, I do believe that our current 3D science can only get us so far. We cannot escape the onion layer by progressing within the scope of our current sciences.

I don’t have influences per say. I just have a strong sense of inner knowing. I’ve always been drawn to spirituality and it just resonates with me. Once we realise we are more than our physical vehicles and begin to discover and integrate this world into our current world - Then that’s when I think we will begin to peel back the layers so to speak

What are your thoughts on spirituality in regards to understanding the next level of existence? I’d be interested to hear your views on spirituality in general.

 

[JamieUK92]

I’d even go as far as saying that our method of language is incapable of taking us to a complete understanding.

I think the spiritual world communicates a form of language that is probably incomprehensible to us at the moment. It’s most probably a language based on pure energetic frequency that our physical selves either cannot reasonate with and/or cannot translate into our own Language.

 

[charlatan]

I'm a continental philosopher, I only discuss these topics with you because it's fun, but it's nowhere near my area of expertise.

Interesting, I didn't know -- I have no experience with continental. What is it like? Super curious now. How does it differ from what we talk of?

 

[Ren]

Interesting, I didn't know -- I have no experience with continental. What is it like? Super curious now. How does it differ from what we talk of?

That's a vast question! I'd say the rift took place around the time that Gottlob Frege published his work on logic in the late 19th/early 20th century. If you like, from then onwards, the Anglo-saxons have tended to restrict the domain of philosophical inquiry to what can be assessed by roughly scientific standards. Continental philosophy does not adhere as much to these scientific standards, for a number of reasons. Maybe the first is that it thinks it limits the scope of philosophy; another important one is that continental philosophers tend to view science as just one approach to conceptualizing truth; they tend to be quite wary of anything founded in "reason" (this will make you scream, no doubt).

Continentals will usually have research interests that analytics would (likely) dismiss as not really researcheable because doing so would involve a violation of those scientific standards. For example: researching the meaning of existence for human being through phenomenological analysis, via Husserl, Heidegger and others. Broadly speaking, continentals favor breadth of scope over methodological rigor. They're not completely "out there", but they're more liberal than analytics in that regard, for sure.

 

[charlatan]

they tend to be quite wary of anything founded in "reason" (this will make you scream, no doubt).

Yeah, so you're right (I'm screaming right now/people are staring!)

I must confess that I do find the extremes of analytic philosophy that essentially try to stick entirely to technical issues a bit frustrating, because I do hope philosophy can address the various big questions.

On the other hand, I also don't think I really understand things like novels, poetry, etc very deeply -- they can come from geniuses, but sadly I find it harder to tune into that sort of genius; I do best with basic bread-and-butter stuff, so I find the analytic school very natural to turn to.

What generally ends up happening as a result of this is I don't end up with much of a conclusion (even if I do end up with a leaning i.e. a hunch as to the conclusion, it's very broad -- like I emphasize in our discussions on neutral monism, really I don't care what you call it -- I'm making nearly no positive claim, just a negative one, namely that I doubt we'll get a reduction of the qualitative side to fundamental physical science stuff or vice versa....that's the only sense I think the answer is neutral... whether you deflate one or the other side or regard them as emergent, I can imagine either being possible at this point).

 

[Sandie33]

Well worth the watch:

 

[Ren]

I must confess that I do find the extremes of analytic philosophy that essentially try to stick entirely to technical issues a bit frustrating, because I do hope philosophy can address the various big questions.

Yes, definitely. To be honest, ever since I dipped my toes into the analytic stuff a few years ago, I've realized that it is way more diverse and willing to tackle the "big questions" than continental teaching had led me to suppose. There's enough stuff that would keep me captivated for a whole lifetime; I find the interface between philosophy of language, logic and metaphysics fascinating, even though I'm not sure that's where the added value of my own philosophical insights lie. Generally as far as the analytic tradition is concerned, I tend to gravitate towards 'post-analytic' or somewhat idiosyncratic thinkers like Wittgenstein.

As far as continental is concerned, I think among the works you might appreciate (given your own background) are Alain Badiou's Being and Event and Quentin Meillassoux's After Finitude. Maybe check those out sometime, as well as more generally the current movement called speculative realism in continental philosophy.

 

[Dado]

@Ren I would say that hinduism and buddhism are the most closest one who explained reality in most clear way. I only see Plotinus among western philosophers who explained metaphysics in very good and clear way.

As for me, from what i learned and directly realize through meditation, reality has three levels :
1. Ultimate reality (Absolute, Source, Emptiness, Void)
2. Singular reality (Consciousness, Oneness, Unity, Being, first derivative of Absolute)
3. Relative reality (reality that we subjectively experience, physical and subtle realms, body/mind, second derivative of Absolute)

Second and third realities are ultimately illusion because they lack inherited independent existence on their own, which means that they depend upon Absolute to exist.
But nevertheless, second and third realities exist and we experience them which is why we can call their existence indescribable. Reality is total mystery and that's whats most beautiful about it

So i would say that my philosophy is some mix of monism and buddhist idealism, some sort of panenthesim.