Would you kill a puppy for $1000000?

[Wyote]

Don;t bother calling me a neo-nazi. Your lover Hitler was a fraud anyway and worked hand-in-hand with the same Ashkenazi families that are now in control of the world central banks, media such as hollywood etc. Everything we know and have been teached is a lie sadly.

Yea this whole thing is a simulation created by Hitler too, probably. Get comfy.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Yea this whole thing is a simulation created by Hitler too, probably. Get comfy.

This is what happens when Norse trickster-gods become forum moderators.

 

[Wyote]

This is what happens when Norse trickster-gods become forum moderators.

I'm just trying to get back to killing puppies for money

 

[Fidicen]

Yea this whole thing is a simulation created by Hitler too, probably. Get comfy.

Does this mean the universe or just the INFJs forums?

This is what happens when Norse trickster-gods become forum moderators.

The forum moderators here are mostly low-key, aren't they?

 

[Wyote]

low-key

omg you went there lolol

Does this mean the universe or just the INFJs forums?

It's all the same my dude, all the same

 

[Pin]

Indeed, and this lack of empirical verifiability could be one way to justify universal animal rights.

Another option would simply be to say: "the strong ought to dominate the weak, as is natural." This is more or less the stance that Nietzsche took, with remarkable (if sometimes spine-chilling) consistency. Because in such a case, you would also have to condone or at least show indifference towards the killing of people with disability (endorsed by Nietzsche, who called disabled people "vegetative cowards"), etc.

Oh hell naw.

 

[Pin]

Don;t bother calling me a neo-nazi. Your lover Hitler was a fraud anyway and worked hand-in-hand with the same Ashkenazi families that are now in control of the world central banks, media such as hollywood etc. Everything we know and have been teached is a lie sadly.

We're not doing this.

I don't condone of antisemitism or holocaust denial.

Disgusting.

@Wyote

 

[Wyote]

We're not doing this.

I don't condone of antisemitism or holocaust denial.

Disgusting.

@Wyote

This person is obviously very confused about a lot of things

 

[Pin]

This person is obviously very confused about a lot of things

Spoiler: Well...

 

[Wyote]

Spoiler: Well...

I gotchu dude

Spoiler

 

[Ren]

This discussion looks like you set up a trap with the initial question, forcing Pin to commit the naturalistic fallacy, i.e. to list properties of human beings as if we could deduce self-evident morals from those properties. But Pin didn't pin down any moral rule, so he didn't actually step into the trap, just very close to it. The causal mechanism you speak of is the spring of the trap. Once you say such a mechanism exists, the view can be refuted on the grounds that we have no compelling reason to say that morals should be decided by natural properties.

Hm, I don't think I was setting up a trap for @Pin, just exploring various possibilities. In a earlier post, he does justify the non-immorality of killing puppies by stating that they are not "special" compared to other species in the way that human beings are. It being implied that what would make it immoral to kill a human being is tied to what makes a human being "special". Which is potentially a completely acceptable position, I think, though it does require specifying the content of that "specialness". It is not enough to claim that homo sapiens is special without detailing in what way.

You make an unexplained logical leap here. Saying that morality requires self-consciousness, it's not at all evident what you mean by morality. By saying it is connected to self-consciousness you imply that morality is a property of a certain kind of being and limited to that. We may consider that sentence being correct now although of course we don't know about the moral feelings of other creatures. However, in this case what you mean by morality is merely an understanding of right or wrong. It does not follow that creatures that have no such sense are outside morality. When we talk about morality we're always talking about human values and that includes not only other human beings but the entire world (whether to pollute the planet etc), which affects our well-being and views in complex ways. So there are two meanings of the word morality you're using: one as a moral sense and another one as a mental phenomenon that has an effect on things. Even if you take the moral sense away from creatures, it's still possible to say that some things are immoral, defining harmful effects etc.

Just to clarify, I didn't put forward this argument as mine, but as an illustration of what may be argued by a defender of the idea that it's not immoral to kill puppies, or any other being that is not human. I wouldn't embrace it, personally; I just put it forth as up for being debated and pulled apart, and I think that you do a good job of showing what is problematic about that line of reasoning. (In fairness, Pin also did). The premise that morality is connected to self-consciousness is definitely not an obvious one, in my opinion also; but I think, intuitively, that a good argument for it might be made, though various definitions would have to be established first, etc. I kind of just assumed that the argument had been virtually made, and embraced the premise following up from that.

I think you're also right that it does not follow from the fact that animals do not "moralize" in the same way that we do, that they have no morals; and even if they truly had no morals at all, it would not evidently follow that human morality should exclude them from its purview. An interesting question here might be: if human morality does include them, how would it? In the climate example that you give, we can at least tie it back to the idea that polluting the planet might ultimately lead to our own demise, that is, the disappearance of humans. So in a way, we would tie it back to ourselves. Can we do this in the case of puppies?

 

[Fidicen]

@Ren I was aware you were only presenting the argument for debate. It's just easier to respond as if the views discussed are held by someone because otherwise one ends up overusing the passive tense and complex sentence structures. I should have been clearer though.

Can we do this in the case of puppies?

Well if we are still going the humans-are-special route, I could say that anything that diminishes the range of human experience is harmful to us, so killing puppies affects humans as well. But then I'd have to allow killing puppies as another experience, and the most obvious counterargument to that would be the utilitarian way, and like most people in this thread, I'm not fond of utilitarianism either.

Spoiler: What if the puppy is Hitler?

Aww.. he looks so sad and tired like he just lost a war.

 

[Ren]

@Ren I was aware you were only presenting the argument for debate. It's just easier to respond as if the views discussed are held by someone because otherwise one ends up overusing the passive tense and complex sentence structures. I should have been clearer though.

No worries! I agree, I tend to do the same

This person is obviously very confused about a lot of things

There are so many kinglears in the world, it's quite frightening really.

 

[Deleted member 16771]

Hm, I don't think I was setting up a trap for @Pin, just exploring various possibilities. In a earlier post, he does justify the non-immorality of killing puppies by stating that they are not "special" compared to other species in the way that human beings are. It being implied that what would make it immoral to kill a human being is tied to what makes a human being "special". Which is potentially a completely acceptable position, I think, though it does require specifying the content of that "specialness". It is not enough to claim that homo sapiens is special without detailing in what way.



Just to clarify, I didn't put forward this argument as mine, but as an illustration of what may be argued by a defender of the idea that it's not immoral to kill puppies, or any other being that is not human. I wouldn't embrace it, personally; I just put it forth as up for being debated and pulled apart, and I think that you do a good job of showing what is problematic about that line of reasoning. (In fairness, Pin also did). The premise that morality is connected to self-consciousness is definitely not an obvious one, in my opinion also; but I think, intuitively, that a good argument for it might be made, though various definitions would have to be established first, etc. I kind of just assumed that the argument had been virtually made, and embraced the premise following up from that.

I think you're also right that it does not follow from the fact that animals do not "moralize" in the same way that we do, that they have no morals; and even if they truly had no morals at all, it would not evidently follow that human morality should exclude them from its purview. An interesting question here might be: if human morality does include them, how would it? In the climate example that you give, we can at least tie it back to the idea that polluting the planet might ultimately lead to our own demise, that is, the disappearance of humans. So in a way, we would tie it back to ourselves. Can we do this in the case of puppies?

The critic always has the advantage here, because axioms are still axioms and can be undermined as such. But of course in this is to be found the magic and mystery of life.

Foundationally, let's say 'in reality', our ethical impulses are merely some misfiring confluence of human group survival instincts. But that's OK.

'Right' and 'wrong' are like the colour purple - an entirely subjective creation of the human mind. But that doesn't mean purple isn't beautiful, or morality meaningful.

So for me, critiques which attack the axioms are rather unhelpful, even if entirely true. Yes, the logic is going to rely on axioms, or infinite regress, or tautology, but we know that already.

So this idea of self-consciousness, &c. as an acceptable axiom I have always found attractive. That is, an axiom to distinguish between which beings deserve moral appreciation, &c.

My formulation was along the lines of a spectrum of sentience. I don't have the patience to be more precise, unfortunately.

So is it OK to eat rocks? Yeah.

Plants? Yeah, but not equally so. The behaviour of plants indicates some kind of desire to live and thrive. However rudimentary. However mechanistic. However unfeeling. They're doing something.

So under this formulation, it is more acceptable to eat a cow than it is to eat a dolphin, for instance.

It's odd to think that plants might exist on a 'spectrum of sentience', but they do. Just like computer programs and mechanical clocks (not sure about those two, but you see what I mean).

And by extension, the further along this spectrum a being exists, the more it deserves ethical consideration, with all the problematics this entails (danger!).

P.S. Sorry for being so lazy! I'm relying on you guys to read between every line here.

 

[charlatan]

I guess consciousness of pain tends to be what my view goes against, no need to be able to form beliefs about that or do any further meta-reflection.

 

[Ren]

I guess consciousness of pain tends to be what my view goes against, no need to be able to form beliefs about that or do any further meta-reflection.

That's a solid view, I think. Would you then be sympathetic towards a moral focus on ataraxia, à la Epicurus?

 

[charlatan]

That's a solid view, I think. Would you then be sympathetic towards a moral focus on ataraxia, à la Epicurus?

What's ataraxia?

I think the main thing I try to stick to is this: if something is going to be universally wrong, it can't fall victim to the standard argument "it's wrong IF I adopt so and so axioms -- relative to those"

The only things I can imagine arguing, based on their very definitions/natures, that one cannot justify doing, are believing contradictions and bringing suffering into being, so far.

Obviously one could live life without consistency, but when it comes to grounding the term 'ought', I cannot imagine that term having meaning personally (that includes wills to power, because once you don't place consistency as a constraint, what's wrong with stating pursuing power as the goal and then pursuing something opposite?)

 

[Ren]

What's ataraxia?

Mental tranquility, equanimity, absence of physical pain.

Epicureanism sees this as the Good (broadly speaking).

 

[charlatan]

I think in terms of universal morals, I keep it really barebones -- so while all those things are ones I personally do strive for, the only things I can't imagine self-consistently striving for regardless one's axioms are

- believing contradictions
- and experiencing states of suffering

And no I absolutely haven't forgotten that, even if someone adopts this, one might worry why creating suffering for others would be excluded -- I think there's an argument against that too that tries to show how it follows from the above.

Now I tend to think if this doesn't work, I most likely will have to stick to being 'moral' (subjectively defined in this case) for emotional reasons -- which isn't too bad, I mean I'm generally affectionate, but I still prefer finding other grounds too if they're really there

 

[Ren]

- believing contradictions